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ABSTRACT
The European Union (“EU”) is the most significant trade partner of the
United States. Trading in goods protected by intellectual property rights remains a
challenge for American business entities as they are forced to sift through a myriad
of law consisting of the federal intellectual property law of the EU and the
intellectual property law of the member states. The European Court of Justice
(“ECJ” or “the Court”) has been faced with dozens of complex cases arising out of
conflicts between the national law of the member states and the Articles of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU” or “the Treaty”) that
mandate the free movement of goods across national lines as one of the TFEU’s
fundamental purposes. This work presents the pertinent issues that arise in
conflicts between the two bodies of law, and provides a thorough explanation and
analysis of the case law of the ECJ on the issue of intellectual property rights and
the free movement of goods.
I.

INTRODUCTION

A. The Importance of Understanding European Union Law and
International Trade Law
The incentive for Americans or those interested in the area of international
trade to study EU law lies, at the very least, in the fact that the EU is the largest
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1

trading partner of the United States. Individually, Germany, France, and the
2
United Kingdom are within the top ten trading partners of the United States.
Professor Daniel C.K. Chow has commented that anyone interested in the area of
3
international trade cannot ignore the EU. Chow has also remarked that the EU is
at the forefront of many emerging international trade issues involving intellectual
4
property rights. Unfortunately, fewer law schools are offering courses on EU law
5
in their curriculums.
Globally, the theory of comparative advantage has found its way into
international law, and has helped develop a body of trade law suggesting that
sovereign governments integrate their economies. It can also be argued that the
6
EU serves as the best example of this type of integration in the modern era. There
are several benefits that economic integration and international trade law bring to
the world. The advantages of free trade include a refined division of labor, higher
real incomes, and greater cross-cultural understanding, all of which in turn bring
7
greater prospects for peace. As international trade law develops to create rules for
economic integration, people, firms, and countries that are party to agreements
8
creating integration are able to make decisions in a more predictable manner.
Despite the well-known benefits of economic integration, international trade
law is required in order to force cooperation between countries since cooperation
9
will not exist if countries are left to their specific interests. Indeed, the incentive
for a country to block imports if they pose real or perceived threats to domestic
industries is significant, and without international trade law forcing rule
recognition by countries seeking to join their economies, economic integration will
10
never become a reality. However, international trade law is an evolving body of
law, inside and outside the EU, and one of the most compelling issues within
international trade law is the balance between the assertion of intellectual property
rights, on the one hand, and undistorted competition and the free movement of
11
goods, on the other hand.

1

Daniela Caruso, EU Law in U.S. Legal Academia, 20 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 175, 176–77
(2011).
2
PAUL KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE
13 (8th ed. 2009).
3
DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: PROBLEMS,
CASES, AND MATERIALS 124 (2008).
4
Id.
5
PAUL D’ANIERI, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: POWER AND PURPOSE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS 178 (1st
ed. 2010).
6
Id. at 249.
7
CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, at 32, 35.
8
KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 2, at 575.
9
CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, at 6.
10
Id.
11
Mauro Squitieri, Refusals to License Under European Union Competition Law After Microsoft,
11 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 65, 65 (2012).
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B. The European Union
The EU possesses 455 million people, accounts for 28% of global gross
12
domestic product, and 20% of global trade.
Professor Malcolm N. Shaw has
13
labeled the EU as the most important European organization.
The EU also
14
represents all of its member states at the World Trade Organization.
The EU’s creation was supported by a goal of keeping the continent out of
war, and a belief that the best way to achieve that goal was to force member state
15
countries to integrate their economies.
This level of economic integration
included removing internal trade barriers and allowing for the free movement of
16
goods, services, capital, and labor to complete the dream of a common market.
However, the framers of the EU also believed that a common market could allow
European member states to compete at a higher level economically in a postwar
17
economy.
A common market, by definition, requires the free flow of goods, services,
capital, and labor and, in the case of the EU, has also led to the harmonization of
standards in education, health, safety, social security, and intellectual property
18
rights. For the common market to be successful, each new member state, and
even the existing member states, must make changes to its domestic laws, such as
laws governing intellectual property rights, competition, and the free movement of
19
goods, so that trade barriers cease to exist unless explicitly allowed by the Treaty.
This attempt at harmonization has been difficult, especially in regard to merging
the former Soviet bloc countries—where intellectual property rights were viewed
20
quite differently—into the EU.
Each revision of the Treaty that governs the
operations of the EU, beginning with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, has required
greater integration and more powers moved from the national governments to the
21
EU. Despite the current financial crisis and the aforementioned challenges, the
22
EU is still the most successful common market in the world.
There are four principal areas of EU law including the Treaty, Regulations,
Directives, and Decision; the Treaty, Regulations, and Decisions have a direct

12

CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, at 124.
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1172 (5th ed. 2003).
14
CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, at 124.
15
D’ANIERI, supra note 5, at 129.
16
SHAW, supra note 13, at 1173.
17
Emily Bolton, Defining Genuine Use Requirements of Community Trade Marks in Light of an
Expanding European Union, 27 CONN. J. INT’L L. 371, 373 (2012).
18
THEODORE H. COHN, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 210 (5th ed.
2010).
19
Guido Ricci, Copyright Protection in Poland, Czech and Slovak Republics and in Hungary,
1994 INT’L BUS. L.J. 81, 81.
20
Id.
21
Julien Chaisse, Promises and Pitfalls of the European Union Policy on Foreign Investment—
How Will the New EU Competence on FDI Affect the Emerging Global Regime, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L.
51, 52 (2012).
22
David A. Gantz, World Trade Law After Doha: Multilateral, Regional, and National
Approaches, 40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 321, 344 (2012).
13
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effect, and thus, member states need not write legislation to implement those forms
23
of law. Directives do not have a direct effect, and thus, member states have some
24
leeway to implement those requirements. Specific to the subject matter of this
work, the purposes of the Directives have been to prevent the conflict in national
laws in the areas of intellectual property use, registration, licensing, and
25
exhaustion, so that the free movement of goods is not impaired.
In turn, the
European Commission has a mission to govern for the benefit of all twenty-seven
member states and this includes the duty of hearing complaints that have been
infringed by member state legislation or action and issuing decisions to remediate
26
infringements.
Additional Directives have been crafted when the Treaty,
decisions from the Commission, and decisions from the ECJ have not been
27
enough.
The ECJ is the judicial organ of the EU. Decisions by the ECJ are directly
applicable to the member states, courts of the member states, and parties operating
28
inside the EU.
The ECJ has been characterized as similar in function to the
United States Supreme Court, in regard to the latter’s relationship to state courts,
29
as the ECJ is the final arbiter of disputes on the subject of EU law.
Most
importantly, the ECJ has held that all EU law is superior to national law, even
domestic constitutional law, and this decision has remarkably been adhered to by
the member states in the same fashion that the United States Supreme Court
30
decisions have been adhered to by American states.
C. Influence of the European Union on International Trade
The successful economic integration of the EU since its creation in 1957
cannot be underestimated. Today, the European Economic Area (“EEA”), which
comprises the twenty-seven member states of the EU and an additional three
31
32
countries, rivals the United States as an economic power. In 1975, the EU’s
Lome Convention provided special trade relations between the EU member states
33
and sixty-eight former colonies. Furthermore, the EU continues to show a desire

23

SHAW, supra note 13, at 162.
Id.
25
Daniel R. Bereskin, Anti-Dilution/Anti-Free-Riding Laws in the United States, Canada, and the
EU: Bridges Too Far?, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1710, 1743–44 (2011).
26
D’ANIERI, supra note 5, 349–50.
27
Bolton, supra note 17, at 375.
28
SHAW, supra note 13, at 142.
29
D’ANIERI, supra note 5, at 350.
30
See, e.g., Case 6/64 Costa v. Ente Nazional per L’Energia Elettrica, 1964 E.C.R. 585. The ECJ
held in this landmark decision that European Union law cannot be overridden by domestic legal
procedures.
31
DOMINICK SALVATORE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 334 (8th ed. 2004). The additional three
countries include Norway, Iceland, and Lichtenstien. Id. Switzerland is the only country that is part of
the European Free Trade Area but is not a member of the EEA. Id.
32
JOAN E. SPERO & JEFFREY A. HART, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 4
(7th ed. 2010).
33
MORDECHAI E. KREININ, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: A POLICY APPROACH 138 (10th ed.
2006).
24
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to develop additional trade agreements with Central and Eastern European
34
countries and allow for the eventual entry of those countries into the EU. Indeed,
the possibility of entry into the EU has forced many non-member states in Europe
35
to follow EU law, thus, further extending the reach of this body of law.
Additionally, the EU, as recently as 2011, discussed opening its common market to
Canada and other countries that at one time were colonies of the EU member states
36
and were not part of the Lome Convention. There has also been some discussion
37
of a free trade agreement between the EU and the United States.
The success of the European common market has pushed other major powers
38
into trade agreements with countries that have less powerful profiles. There is
evidence that the partnership between the countries making up the North American
Free Trade Agreement was birthed due to the concern over, and lust for, the EU’s
39
success.
The same concerns have led to discussions among countries in the
40
Western Hemisphere to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (“FTAA”).
The development of a FTAA, in conjunction with the EEA, could lead to the world
41
experiencing three large trading blocs, including a large Asian trade group.
Not all attempts at economic integration around the globe have been
successful. Mercosur, a regional trade bloc including Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay,
and Uruguay, has not been successful in moving from a customs union to a
common market largely due to protectionist infighting and the failure to create the
42
necessary inter-governmental institutions. There is also some comment that the
43
EU may not be able to sufficiently adopt additional member states.
D. Differences between the European Union and the United States
Both the EU and the United States have an understanding that a country’s
44
level of competitiveness is based on its ability to innovate.
Despite the
agreement between the two trade partners on the need to push for innovation, there
are differences between them as to how to regulate the balance between intellectual
property rights and the free movement of goods. Firms operating in the EU and
the United States must carefully calculate their behavior in each market due to the
stark differences in the law governing the exercise of intellectual property rights in
45
the face of competition law. Bluntly, there is a greater risk of being charged with

34

SPERO & HART, supra note 32, at 100.
Id. at 44.
36
Gantz, supra note 22, at 352.
37
Id. at 357.
38
SPERO & HART, supra note 32, at 112.
39
THOMAS OATLEY, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 43 (4th ed. 2010).
40
SPERO & HART, supra note 32, at 112.
41
OATLEY, supra note 39, at 43.
42
Gantz, supra note 22, at 346–47.
43
KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 2, at 589.
44
CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, at 200.
45
Renata B. Hesse, Counseling Clients on Refusal to Supply Issues in the Wake of the EC
Microsoft Case, 22 ANTITRUST, Spring 2008, at 32, 35.
35
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46

anti-competitive behavior in the EU.
This risk could lead to a lessening of
47
intellectual property rights.
Furthermore, within the specific scope of intellectual property rights, there
are differences between the EU and the United States. For example, in the area of
trademark law, rights to a trademark are registration-based in the EU whereas in
48
the United States, trademark rights are use-based. In total, the difference in the
law between the two trade partners has created an appreciable effect on market
49
prices in many areas of commerce, such as the pharmaceutical industry. In the
EU individual countries set pharmaceutical prices and have enacted laws that allow
50
governments to curb intellectual property rights to make such purchases easier.
In contrast, stronger intellectual property rights are found in the United States,
which also allows its private sector health care system to set the prices of
51
pharmaceuticals.
The EU has struggled to find a uniform, federal-style law that harmonizes
the balance between intellectual property rights and the free movement of goods
and competition law that is necessary to integrate the economies of twenty-seven
52
member states. One can only imagine the problems presented in trying to bridge
the legal gap between the entire EU and the United States on this issue. There was
an attempt by the two trade partners to resolve extraterritorial conflicts in the area
of trade law in 1991, but the ECJ struck down the agreement as an ultra vires act
53
by the European Commission. Regardless of the legal gap that remains, the two
trade partners are likely to keep significant trade relations due to geography,
54
culture, language, and political interests.
E. The Purpose of This Work
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the balance the EU has crafted
between the protection of intellectual property rights, on one hand, and the Treatybased preference for the free movement of goods and undistorted competition, on
the other hand. This work will begin by briefly exploring the applicable provisions
of the Treaty involved in this balance, followed by a discussion of the exhaustion
of rights doctrine. Most of this work will be dedicated to the case law from the
ECJ that provides the reader with a detailed sense of the balance based on the
pertinent facts of each case and the associated holdings of the ECJ.

46

Id.
Id.
48
Bolton, supra note 17, at 384.
49
Silvio Cappellari, Reverse Payment Settlements in the EU—Finding the Right Dosage, 7
COMPETITION L. INT’L, no. 2, 2011, at 27, 31.
50
Id. at 27.
51
Id. at 28.
52
Squitieri, supra note 11, at 77.
53
SHAW, supra note 13, at 618.
54
KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 2, at 16.
47
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APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION

Advocate General Federico Mancini of the ECJ commenting on the debate
between the free movement of goods and the recognition of intellectual property
rights, stated in Pharmon BV v. Hoechst AG:
The questions formulated . . . provide the Court with another opportunity to
consider one of the most interesting and complex issues of Community law.
Essentially the Court is asked to balance the requirements of the free movement of
goods against the need to protect the industrial property rights and commercial
55
guarantees provided for in the legal orders of the Member States.

The Treaty placed member states in a position whereby they forfeited their
individual power to act as autonomous actors in the sphere of trade as early as
1952 with the ratification of the Treaty creating the European Coal and Steel
56
Community. Any discussion of the legal framework of the EU’s common market
57
should begin with Article 18’s prohibition on discrimination based on nationality.
Article 18’s general prohibition applies to goods, services, capital, and labor and is
often cited by firms and member states claiming that another member state has
58
written protectionist legislation. Article 18 also gives the European government
the power to write regulations and directives that are more specific in nature in an
59
attempt to combat nationality discrimination.
In matters involving intellectual
property rights, Article 18 is often cited by those arguing discrimination based on
60
the country of origin of the goods.
The drafters of the Amsterdam Treaty made sure to maintain the balance
between the uninterrupted free trade of goods and services and the protection of
intellectual property rights. Article 34 states that there can be no restrictions on
61
imports by member states. Likewise, Article 35 prohibits the same restrictions
62
on exports, although this Article is rarely invoked in this debate.
The free
movement of goods is further protected by Article 101, which prohibits trade
agreements between business associations or member states that fix prices, limit

55

Case 19/84, Pharmon BV v. Hoechst AG, 1985 E.C.R. 2281, 2282.
Sophie Meunier & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Who Speaks for Europe? The Delegation of Trade
Authority in the EU, 37 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 477, 479 n.1 (1999).
57
Article 18 of the Treaty states: “Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without
prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall
be prohibited. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary
legislative procedure, may adopt rules designed to prohibit such discrimination.” Consolidated Version
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 34, March 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 53) 1.61
[hereinafter TFEU].
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
See, e.g., Case 15/81, Gaston Schul Douane Expediteur BV v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en
Accijnzen, 1982 E.C.R. 1409, 1418, 1428–29 (referring to EEC Treaty Article 12 [now TFEU Article
18]).
61
Article 34 states: “Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect
shall be prohibited between Member States.” TFEU art. 34.
62
Article 35 states: “Quantitative restrictions on exports, and all measures having equivalent
effect, shall be prohibited between Member States.” TFEU art. 35.
56

2012

FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

53
63

production, and restrict sources of supply and many other commercial activities.
Additionally, Article 102 prohibits a business entity from abusing a “dominant
position” in the marketplace, and enumerates conditions that constitute the abuse
64
of a dominant position. Article 102 provides for powerful remedies that force a
65
member state or a firm to change its business practices. Article 102 has been

63

Article 101 states:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or
investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be
automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the
case of:
—any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
—any decision or category of decisions by associations of
undertakings;
—any concerted practice or category of concerted practices,
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in
respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
TFEU art. 101.
64
Article 102 states:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
[common] market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible
with the [common] market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other
unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice
of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
TFEU art. 102.
65
Ian S. Forrester, Article 82: Remedies in Search of Theories?, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 919, 948
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labeled by at least one academic as having a strong sense of morality attached to it
66
and being distinctively European in application.
As stated above, the free
movement of services is protected by Article 56, which prohibits restrictions by
67
member states on the nationals of the member states who perform such services.
Article 56 goes as far as allowing the European Council and the Commission to
68
extend this principle to nationals of non-member states. Furthermore, Article 56
provides rights and limitations to both broadcasters and recipients of broadcasted
69
materials.
The above articles of the TFEU are balanced by Article 36, which allows
exceptions to Articles 34 and 35, including the ability of member states to protect
70
intellectual property. Therefore, if one were to keep a scorecard of sorts, Articles
34, 35, 56, 101, and 102 are cited by parties believing that intellectual property
rights asserted by right holders infringe upon the EU Treaty policy of unrestricted
free movement of goods and services and undistorted competition (together, “trade
restraint”). In contrast, Article 36 is cited by rights holders and member states
arguing that an intellectual property right granted by one state must be recognized
71
by another state.

(2005).
66
Id. at 919.
67
Article 56 states:
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on freedom to
provide services within the [Community] shall be prohibited in respect of
nationals of Member States who are established in a Member State other than that
of the person for whom the services are intended.
The European Parliament and the Council acting in accordance with ordinary
legislative procedure, may extend the provisions of the Chapter to nationals of a
third country who provide services and who are established within the
[Community].
TFEU art. 56.
68
Id.
69
Astrid Janssen, Copyright Licensing Revisited, 13 GERMAN L.J. 124, 126 (2012).
70
Article 36 of the Treaty states:
The provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude prohibitions or
restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public
morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of
humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic,
historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial
property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means
of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member
States.
TFEU art. 36. Interestingly enough, the United States Patent Act does not allow for morality to play a
role in the decision of patentability. See generally Cynthia M. Ho, Splicing Morality and Patent Law:
Issues Arising from Mixing Mice and Men, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 247, 256 (2000).
71
Joined Cases C-321–324/94, Pistre, Barthes, Milhau, and Oberti, 1997 E.C.R. I-2360, I-2377.
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III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EXHAUSTION OF RIGHTS
DOCTRINE
A. The Exhaustion of Rights Doctrine, Generally
Much of the debate on the balance between the protection of intellectual
property and the free movement of goods and undistorted competition is centered
on whether intellectual property rights should exist in all circumstances or whether
there should be limitations on an intellectual property owner’s assertion of rights.
However, the debate also centers on how far the intellectual property rights extend
outside of the member state granting those rights. This is the exhaustion of rights
72
doctrine.
At a basic level, the exhaustion of rights doctrine, also known as the “first
sale doctrine,” prohibits an intellectual property right holder from exercising rights
73
over a good or service once it is sold. The exhaustion of rights doctrine operates
74
much like a physical border. The doctrine, as practiced by the ECJ, allows an
intellectual property right holder to restrict the use, manufacture and sale of the
75
protected product within the state that granted that right. However, once the right
holder agrees in some manner to the sale of the protected product in another state,
the right holder cannot assert his intellectual property right to block the movement
of the product throughout the other member states or back into the state that
76
granted the intellectual property protection (a parallel import).
Therefore, the
intellectual property right is “exhausted” at the border once the right holder has
77
acquiesced to the sale of the protected product abroad.
Therefore, the right
holder must choose between maintaining complete control of the protected product
domestically or reaping the potential financial rewards of placing the product in the
markets of other states. The doctrine, at least in theory, applies to patents,
78
trademarks, and copyrights. However, there is evidence in the case law that the
exhaustion of rights doctrine does not apply to goods outside of the EU or EEA,
79
although the point remains debatable.
Relatedly, it could be argued that under Article 101, any agreement between
two business associations—such as an intellectual property right holder and a
distributor—that limits the movement of a good violates the TFEU as an
agreement in restraint of trade. Additionally, if the intellectual property right
holder is successful enough, the right holder may be attacked as abusing a
dominant position if the right holder attempts to assert his intellectual property

72

Darren E. Donnelly, Parallel Trade and International Harmonization of the Exhaustion of
Rights Doctrine, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 445, 447 (1997).
73
Irene Calboli, Trademark Exhaustion in the European Union: Community-Wide or
International? The Saga Continues, 6 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 47, 47–48 (2002).
74
STEPHEN WEATHERILL & P.R. BEAUMONT, EU LAW 978 (3d ed. 1999).
75
Id. at 981.
76
Id. at 980.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 980, 983, 990.
79
Susan Singleton, Matters of Import, 4 SUPPLY MGMT. 45, 45 (1999).

56

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW

Vol. VI:1

right to block the free movement of goods. Generally, a violation of Article 102
requires that the intellectual property right holder establish a dominant position in
80
the market and that there is an intentional abuse of the dominant market position.
In summation, as it has been argued by academics, “EU competition law views all
81
licenses as ‘guilty until proven innocent.’”
Intellectual property rights are limited to the territoriality principle unless an
82
international treaty extends those rights across national borders. The territoriality
principle in an important component of the concept of a common market requiring
the free movement of goods in that an intellectual property owner can only assert
rights within the member state that grants the rights, but not beyond that member
83
state’s borders. Although all member states have accepted the notion of national
exhaustion of intellectual property rights, the new battleground seems to be
whether member states should recognize the international exhaustion of
84
intellectual property rights. The doctrine of international exhaustion, if adopted,
will allow for the exhaustion of intellectual property rights when the right holder
has voluntarily placed the protected goods anywhere in the world and the set of
rights held will be unenforceable in all countries regardless of whether the
85
countries involved in the dispute recognized those rights.
Today, there is
evidence that member states are pushing for rules allowing for greater international
86
exhaustion of intellectual property rights.
Recently, however, the European
Parliament rejected the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (“ACTA”) despite
87
the fact that all twenty-seven member states had approved the pact. The ACTA
would make it a criminal offense to engage in trademark and copyright
88
infringement.
Although international exhaustion is not the dominant theory, it seems as if
the ECJ and the European Commission have gone as far as adopting a form of
“regional exhaustion” or “Community-based exhaustion” that allows for the
exhaustion of intellectual property rights once the protected good or service is
89
voluntarily placed anywhere in the EU. However, there are limitations to the free
movement of goods, such as in cases whereby the protected goods have been
90
stolen and moved across international borders. In fact, at the time of this writing,
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the European Commission is considering adopting criminal penalties for violations
91
of intellectual property rights.
The ECJ and European Commission have been challenged to harmonize this
body of law, which requires substantive, nationally-granted intellectual property
92
This
rights to fit into the mold of Treaty Articles 34, 36, 56, 101, and 102.
93
challenge is even more intense in regard to technology transfer across borders.
However, the theory of “Community-wide” exhaustion of intellectual property
rights has become the standard for most international trade agreements that address
94
these rights.
But because intellectual property rights are so sensitive, most
international agreements, if they address intellectual property rights, are silent on
95
issue of exhaustion.
Article 6 of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights specifically states that Articles 3 and 4, which pertain to the allimportant concepts of “national treatment” and “Most-Favored-Nation Treatment,”
96
are not to include the concept of exhaustion of intellectual property rights. The
ACTA does not address exhaustion and plainly states that members to that
agreement need not create special rights or obligations beyond the scope of its
97
domestic law. The EEA Agreement specifically stated that all member states to
that agreement must adjust their domestic laws to provide for “regional
98
exhaustion.”
Therefore, “Community-wide” exhaustion principles apply to all
99
thirty member states that make up the EEA.
B. The Exhaustion of Rights Doctrine in Case Law
The EU was just over two decades old when the ECJ rendered a far-reaching
opinion in Donckerwolcke v. Procureur that solidified the concepts of both non100
discrimination and the free movement of goods.
In a case with ramifications for
all intellectual property rights, but with a particular focus on trademark
requirements, the ECJ held that importing member states cannot require a country
of origin indication beyond the member state country that serves as the exporting
101
state.
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In Donckerwolcke, Belgian merchants had obtained synthetic cloth that was
originally derived from Syria and Lebanon and then imported the goods into
102
France with only a country of origin indication of Belgium.
The French
government prohibited the merchants’ attempt at importation since the import
103
certificate did not state Syria or Lebanon.
The merchants were charged
104
criminally under French law.
The case was referred to the ECJ by the French
court hearing the appeal.
According to the ECJ, the French requirement that the “originating” country
of origin be indicated on the imported goods violated Article 34’s prohibition on
105
the domestic laws that restrict trade between member states.
The ECJ flatly
stated that the only possible obligation that can be imposed on an importer of
goods that have been freely placed within the EU is to identify the member state
that serves as the exporting country and that a member state cannot set
requirements on an importer to declare an origin other that what it knows or should
106
know.
In addition to a violation of Article 34, the ECJ also found that the French
law violated Article 28, which prohibits member states from adopting rules
intending to create different rules for products with regard to their country of
origin and depending upon whether the goods originated from a member state or a
107
non-member state.
The Court reasoned that the assimilation of goods freely
placed in the EU are to be designated as in “free circulation” and must be subject
to the same rules in regard to the TFEU regardless of whether they were
108
manufactured or garnered originally inside or outside the EU.
However, counterfeited goods originating from an external country are not
afforded the same protections. Article 207 of the TFEU was the source of
Regulation 3295/94, a predecessor to Regulation 1383/2003, which prohibits the
109
release for “free circulation” of goods that are counterfeit or pirated.
In
Polo/Ralph Lauren v. Dwidua, the ECJ made several important statements about
the enforcement power of a member state’s customs authority under Regulation
110
3295/94.
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Id. ¶ 21. Article 28 states:
1. The Union shall comprise a customs union which shall cover all trade in goods
and which shall involve the prohibition between Member States of customs
duties on imports and exports and of all charges having equivalent effect, and the
adoption of a common customs tariff in their relations with third countries.
2. The provisions of Article 30 and of Chapter 2 of this Title shall apply to
products originating in Member States and to products coming from third
countries which are in free circulation in Member States.
TFEU art. 28.
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In Polo/Ralph Lauren, Dwidua, an Indonesian-based clothing manufacturer
was accused by Polo/Ralph Lauren of importing into Austria, and then Poland,
clothing items that violated both verbal and pictorial trademarks owned by the
111
latter.
After a favorable decision by the Austrian court, Polo/Ralph Lauren
requested that the clothing items be seized by the Austrian authorities and then
112
later destroyed at Dwidua’s expense.
However, the Austrian court was unsure
as to whether it has jurisdiction to apply Regulation 3295/94 because the
counterfeit goods were moving from a non-member state to a member state, and
then on to another non-member state and thus the Austrian government only had
113
“temporary custody” of the goods.
According to the ECJ, Regulation 3295/94 allows an owner of intellectual
property rights to file a complaint with the customs authority of the member state
that comes into contact with the pirated or counterfeit goods when the right holder
suspects that the goods are pirated or counterfeit, and requires that the right holder
provide the member state’s customs authority with all pertinent knowledge about
114
both the intellectual property rights and the actions of the infringing party.
The
member state’s customs authority has the power to seize the goods accused of
infringement on its own initiative or can seize the goods upon receipt of the right
115
holder’s written complaint.
However, the determination of whether the goods
are infringing upon the intellectual property rights of the right holder are based on
116
the domestic law on the member state that has effectively seized the goods.
Three key statements about the power of the EU and its member states to
combat infringement of intellectual property rights were made by the European
Court of Justice in the Polo/Ralph Lauren case. First, the ECJ stated that
Regulation 3295/94 was designed to prevent the transit of infringing goods even if
their journey began in a non-member state, continued through a member state, and
117
were subject to a final destination in another member state.
Second, the Court
stated that the domicile of the right holder was irrelevant in regard to Regulation
118
3295/94, and thus, irrelevant to a member state’s enforcement power.
Third,
and related to the first statement, a member state’s customs authority does not face
a limitation in power if the goods passing through the EU are not subject to import
119
duties or other charges.
It also bears mention that the ECJ also took into
account the duty of member states to combat intellectual property infringement
under the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”)

2000 E.C.R. I-2519, I-2522.
111
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112
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113
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120

agreement.
The Donckerwolcke and Polo/Ralph Lauren cases make it clear that goods
coming from outside the EU can present unique problems. The ECJ wrestled with
another, challenging case involving goods that were believed to be infringing upon
trademark rights but originated from outside Europe in Class International BV v.
121
Colgate-Palmolive Company (“Beecham”).
Class International was a
Netherlands-based warehousing firm that brought into the EU toothpaste products
that it purchased from a South African exporter with the “Aquafresh” trademark,
which is owned by Beecham and registered by Beecham at the Benelux Trade
122
Mark Office.
Beecham had been informed that the toothpaste products were
counterfeit and petitioned the Dutch government to seize and search the
123
124
products.
The Dutch government complied with the request.
However, after
an examination of the products, the products were deemed to not to be counterfeit
and Class International petitioned the Dutch government for both release of the
goods and an order against Beecham to pay for costs suffered due to the seizure of
125
the goods and the Dutch government then referred the case to the ECJ.
Again, the Court stated that Article 28 of the Treaty requires that once goods
originating from outside the EU are released for “free circulation” they become
“Community goods” and Article 29 of the Treaty requires that goods coming from
non-EU member states are placed into free circulation once all import formalities
126
have been complied with and all customs duties and taxes have been satisfied.
Two additional provisions of EU law were at question as well, including Directive
89/104/EEC and Regulation 40/94. Directive 89/104/EEC provides that registered
trademark holders have exclusive rights to their marks that are placed in the course
of trade and such holders may prohibit the sale, marketing, or importation of
127
infringing goods.
The same Directive, however, does not allow a trademark
holder to prohibit the use of its mark when the trademarked goods have been
128
placed on the market in the EU with the holder’s consent.
Regulation 2913/92
creates the EU’s external transit procedure that allows non-EU goods to move
129
through the EU without being subject to import duties and other charges.
Class International’s first contention was that the toothpaste products that it

120
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possessed were not being “imported” but were rather “in transit” at the time the
goods were brought into the EU and also that, at the time the goods were seized,
130
Class International did not have a purchaser.
Class International also suggested
that the mere placing of the goods in a warehouse for external transit did not
constitute an act of using the trademark in the course of trade to which a trademark
131
holder could prohibit the further movement of the goods.
The ECJ agreed with Class International and held that the mere warehousing
of trademarked goods pursuant to the external transit procedure would not allow a
trademark holder to prohibit the movement of trademarked goods through the EU
132
by exercising trademark rights under Directive 89/103/EEC.
The ECJ also
stated that the mere fact that the trademarked goods were warehoused does not
mean that they are being “imported,” nor are the trademarks being used in the
course of trade, so long as the importer has not informed the member state’s
133
customs authority that it intends to release the goods into free circulation.
According to the Court, it does not matter that there is a mere chance that these
trademarked products might later be released for free circulation and thus the
trademark holder cannot prohibit Class International from bringing the goods into
134
the EU.
The ECJ flatly stated that the only way in which a trademark holder can
block goods from further transit and/or importation is if the possessor-importer of
135
the goods has made an express offering for sale of the goods.
One last question needed to be resolved by the ECJ in Class International.
Class International asserted that the party who claims that the trademarked goods
infringed their rights provided in Directive 89/103/EEC bears the burden of proof
136
on this issue.
In contrast, Beecham stated that the trademark holder should only
have to prove interference with the mark and, once this is established, the burden
should shift to the alleged infringing party as to whether infringement of rights
137
under the Directive occurred.
The Court held that the burden of proof to
establish a violation of rights under the Directive should be placed on the
138
trademark holder and not on the alleged infringing party.
The ECJ furthered its
remark by indicating the need for a Directive on this particular issue, and for EU
law generally, warning against a condition whereby, if there were no Directive,
member states could individually apply the burden of proof, leading to much
139
variety in the law.
Switzerland is located in the heart of the European continent, but is not part
of the EU or part of the EEA. Instead, it sits alone as the one country in the
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European Free Trade Area not incorporated into either club. In Kodak AG v.
Jumbo Markt AG, the Swiss Federal Court decided that Swiss law was also not
140
incorporated into the law of either larger club.
Kodak AG (“Kodak”) held a Swiss patent on film and began selling that film
in the United Kingdom, a country that is also a member state of the EU and the
141
Jumbo Markt AG had obtained the film and attempted to bring it into
EEA.
Switzerland through a parallel import scheme. Kodak attempted to block the sale
142
of the film in Switzerland through the assertion of its Swiss patent rights.
While
deciding that Kodak could prohibit the parallel import via Swiss patent rights, the
Swiss Federal Court wrote at length discussing the differences among the types of
intellectual property rights and the differences among the law in European
143
countries.
What made the Kodak decision difficult for the Swiss Federal Court was the
reality that Swiss statutory law did not address whether Swiss patent rights were
144
After examining the
subject to national exhaustion or international exhaustion.
law of its European neighbors, the Swiss Federal Court made several conclusions
about the status of intellectual property rights and the exhaustion of those rights.
First, the Swiss Federal Court believed that Swiss law was in harmony with the
doctrine of national exhaustion which, according to the Court, was the dominant
legal theory. On the other hand, international exhaustion was a newer legal theory
and thus a separation of legal theory between Switzerland and the EU was
145
possible.
Second, the Swiss Federal Court decided that although there is a
movement to treat all intellectual property rights similarly in regard to exhaustion,
there is reason to treat patent rights on the one hand differently from copyright and
trademark rights due to the different functions they serve and the intellectual
146
achievements they recognize.
The Swiss Federal Court found that copyright
protection served to meet aesthetic concerns of the creator while patent rights
served to meet every day needs and trademark rights served only to allow for
147
product identification.
The Swiss Federal Court also summarized what it believed to be the status of
ECJ jurisprudence on the exhaustion principle. According to the Swiss Court, the
ECJ has always preferred the free movement of goods to national exhaustion rules
148
and has treated all intellectual property rights in similar fashion.
However, the
Swiss Federal Court believed that, individually, the member states of the EU were
of different beliefs in regard to national exhaustion principles and, thus, there was
no uniform theory on the continent that all intellectual property rights should be

140
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149

addressed similarly in regard to exhaustion.
The Swiss Court did not believe
150
that uniformity on the subject had been achieved through the TRIPS Agreement.
Seemingly because of this lack of harmony on the European continent, the
Swiss Federal Court held that the holder of a Swiss patent should be able to
prohibit the introduction of a protected product into Switzerland even if that patent
151
holder had voluntarily placed the product in the international market place.
The
Swiss Federal Court felt no obligation to hold otherwise since there was no
152
agreement in place between Switzerland and the EU.
C. Analysis of the Exhaustion of Rights Doctrine.
The exhaustion of rights doctrine is designed to limit the ability of member
states to enact barriers to the free movement of goods, even in regard to intellectual
property rights. The exhaustion of rights doctrine, as interpreted and applied by
the ECJ, seems to be an effective check against the ability of a member state to use
domestic intellectual property rights to promote domestic sales. However, some
risks do exist even given the existing law.
The Donckerwolcke case is quite illustrative. The French government
certainly had an incentive to require country of origin labels on goods imported
from other countries in order to spur consumer sentiment against imports.
However, if the goods were directly from Belgium, the anti-import sentiment
would not be as nearly significant in comparison from goods from the Middle East.
One could only imagine that French consumers might not fret about purchasing
goods from their close cousins, the Belgians, but might rebel against purchasing
goods from a third world, non-European country if those same goods competed
with domestically produced equivalents.
The ruling in Donckerwolcke also reveals a risk to those who manufacture
goods within the EEA. The ECJ essentially allows goods to “pass through”
member states when the goods are originally made in a non-EEA member state and
only be subject to a country of origin label designating the EU member state.
Thus, consumers would not likely know from what country the goods originated.
This, in turn, would allow importers and exporters the ability to get low-cost goods
into the EU if a member state with lax import rules will allow entry of the goods.
Although the ECJ has made it clear, in the cases above and below, that
substantive intellectual property law is domestic law and suffers from a lack of
harmony. The Polo/Ralph Lauren case illustrates a potential problem regarding
the enforcement of Article 34 in that, since standards for infringement are
domestic, member states can have different standards for what constitutes patent,
trademark, or copyright infringement. Therefore, according to the Polo/Ralph
Lauren case, member states collectively may have different standards by which
goods may be seized. Thus, member states may have an incentive to craft their
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infringement standards that allow for foreign goods to be seized more often
making importation more challenging.
There are only two limitations on this practice. First, any infringement
standard must apply equally to goods be they manufactured domestically or in
another member state. The second is found in the Class International case where
the ECJ held that goods seized due to infringement concerns must be placed in
“free circulation” inside the member state attempting to seize them and merely
moving them through the member state is not placing the goods in “free
circulation.”
The Kodak case poses another threat to the harmonization of “European”
free movement of goods. The EU is made up of only twenty-seven of Europe’s
countries and the EEA is made up of an additional three countries. Therefore, a
European country not part of the EU is free to draft and enforce intellectual
property law as it wishes. It remains a question as to whether countries not in the
EEA will continue to adopt national exhaustion principles that allow for the
blocking of imported goods even if they are voluntarily placed in the market.
Firms wishing to operate on the European continent must make sure that they
secure intellectual property rights in all countries in which they do business. They
may also take the Kodak case as signifying that they can block parallel imports into
non-EEA countries that adhere to national exhaustion principles.
IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND BARRIERS TO THE FREE MOVEMENT OF
GOODS
A. Free Movement, Competition, and Patents
1.

Case Law

a. Parallel Imports
One of the first cases involving the balance between intellectual property
153
rights and trade restraint to reach the ECJ was Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel.
The plaintiff, Parke-Davis, was an American company that held patents granted by
Dutch law on a chemical and biological process called chloramphenicol, which is
154
used to create antibiotics.
Several defendant firms bought, marketed, and resold
the products made from the process without the permission of the plaintiff and
155
asserted as a defense Articles 101 and 102.
The defendants argued that the
exercise of patent rights under Dutch law by the plaintiff was an agreement in
violation of Article 101, as an agreement that restricted trade, and a violation of
156
Article 102 in that the plaintiff was abusing a dominant position.
The ECJ made two separate rulings on the issues arising from Articles 101

153
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156
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and 102, both to the favor of the plaintiff.
First, that Articles 101 and 102 are
158
not violated merely because one asserts their rights under patent law.
More
specifically, the ECJ ruled that a violation of Article 102 requires abuse of the
159
dominant position that is incompatible with the common market.
Second, the
ECJ stated that Article 36 justifies some restrictions in order to protect intellectual
160
property, subject only to the limitations prescribed in Articles 34 and 35.
In the
end it was Article 36 that served as the balance against Articles 34, 35, 101 and
102 as the Court held that neither Article 101 nor Article 102 of the TFEU
prevents the holder of a patent granted by a member state from claiming on the
basis of his patent right an injunction against the import of the protected products
from another member state in which the products and their manufacturing process
161
are not patentable.
162
In Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV, the ECJ went as far as calling the free
163
movement of goods within the territory of the member states a “guarantee.”
In
this case, Merck had patented its hypertension drug, Moduretic, in all member
164
states except Luxembourg and Italy.
In Italy, it was unable to obtain a patent
165
due to Italian Constitutional restrictions existing from the 1960s.
However,
166
Merck still sold its drug in Italy.
The defendant, Stephar, purchased the drug in
Italy in large quantities and resold them in the Netherlands at a much lower price
167
than Merck’s price for the same drug in the same market.
Merck asserted its
Dutch patent right seeking to block Stephar’s importation of Merck’s drug for sale
168
into the Netherlands.
The ECJ ruled that Merck’s effort was incompatible with

157
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Id. at 58. The ECJ held:
[I]n other words, the dominant position on the market must be used as a means of
obtaining a certain end. One wonders whether that can be the case when the
national patent right is exercised, given that the latter is solely determined by the
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occupies on the market.
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exercise of the rights arising under a patent granted in accordance with the
legislation of a Member State does not, of itself, constitute an infringement of the
rules on competition laid down by the Treaty.
Id. at 71.
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EU law.
The Court granted Merck little sympathy since it was not able to secure a
patent and was already marketing and selling its pharmaceutical in Italy.
Throughout the case, the ECJ cited several opinions on the issue concerning a
balance between Articles 36 on the one hand and Articles 34 and 35, on the other
170
hand.
Advocate General Reischl’s lack of sympathy may have rested on its
assertion of what a common market requires, including:
[T]hat it is one of the fundamental principles of a common market that any product
which has been lawfully put on the market in a Member State must be allowed to
circulate freely within the Community, unless the protection of a right or interest
which is recognized in the Community legal order as being of greater value requires
171
[otherwise].

Advocate General Reischl also contended that there is very little link
172
between “patentability and price levels.”
The ECJ stated that there were several
173
other price factors that play a role in the price of pharmaceuticals.
In Pharmon BV v. Hoeschst AG, Advocate General Mancini of the ECJ gave
one of its best explanations of the balance between Article 30 (ex 36), that
provides protection for intellectual property, and Articles 34, 35, 101, and 102,
which ensure the free movement of goods that may be at some level protected by
174
national patent, trademark, or copyright law.
Hoeschst, holding a patent for the
pharmaceutical “frusemide” in three member states, including the United
Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands, signed a licensing agreement with a
DDSA, a British firm, that allowed DDSA the sole ability to manufacture, import,
175
and sell frusemide in the United Kingdom.
Shortly before the patent was to
extinguish in the United Kingdom, DDSA violated the agreement by selling the
pharmaceutical to Pharmon, a Dutch firm, whereby it was clear that Pharmon
176
desired to penetrate the Netherlands market.
Hoeschst immediately moved to
assert its patent, under British law, and the associated licensing agreement to block
177
Pharmon’s move into the Netherlands with Hoeschst’s patented pharmaceutical.
The Advocate General made three general and helpful pronouncements
about the balance between intellectual property protection and trade restraint.
First, the ECJ defined the principle of territoriality by stating, “That principle

169
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means that Community law cannot confer on the holder of a compulsory licence
178
[sic] rights which may also be relied on in the territory of other [s]tates.”
In
other words, it is not the responsibility of the EU to create rights for patent holders
outside of the state that grants those rights. Second, the Advocate General, while
179
citing Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug Inc., stated that Article 36 allows for some
derogation from the general principle that the law of member states cannot be used
180
to limit the free flow of goods across the borders of member states.
Third, the
Advocate General described the principle of exhaustion or “extinction” of rights.
The Advocate General stated:
[I]ncorporated into “the body of Community law” the principle that rights and
powers deriving from a patent are extinguished, and therefore may no longer be
relied upon, when the protected product has been marketed—by the patent
proprietor with his consent—in every country in the Community. The reasons
which led the Court to adopt that rule (known as the “exhaustion of the exclusive
181
rights”) were set out in the judgment in Merck.

Having stated those three principles, the ECJ still had to wrestle with the
decision at hand. The Court found that Hoeschst could exercise its patent rights to
block the introduction of the patented drug by Pharmon into the Netherlands since
Hoeschst never gave consent for the product to be introduced into the
182
Netherlands.
The key fact relied upon the Court in finding that Article 36 could
protect Hoeschst’s rights was that the license agreement did not allow DDSA to do
anything but operate in the United Kingdom. However, the ECJ left open the
possibility that Hoeschst could not assert its rights to block the introduction of the
183
drug if the firm had in some way consented to its marketing in the Netherlands.
b. Compulsory Licensing
Article 34 has also been asserted by the Court to bar the practice of national
authorities using their discretion to selectively choose those who might obtain a
184
license for the right to import patented products.
In Generics (UK) Ltd. v. Smith
Kline & French Laboratories Ltd., the ECJ ruled that the British government could
not carve out of Article 36 an exception to Article 34 to allow its Comptroller the
power to grant a license of right to import patented products into the United
185
Kingdom from both member and non-member states.
Pursuant to the British
Patents Act of 1977, the Comptroller could be petitioned to settle conflicts between
firms on the issue of licensing for sale patented products when the raw materials

178
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required for the patented product were made in other member states.
In question
here was the right to import the pharmaceutical “Cimetidine” whose raw materials
were imported into the United Kingdom, where the product was finalized and then
marketed inside the United Kingdom, in other member states, and in non-member
187
states.
Generics and Harris, two pharmaceutical firms, could not agree with
Smith Kline & French Laboratories on a licensing agreement and petitioned the
188
British Comptroller for a resolution.
The Comptroller denied the license, and
189
the British Patents Court upheld the Comptroller’s decision.
The ECJ treated the raw material of Cimetidine as if it were a finished
product in regard to whether Article 34 applied and in doing so ruled that the
Patents Act created the potential for a quantitative restriction for which Article 36
190
could not save.
The Court was firm in that the British Comptroller could not
exercise its discretion to limit the importation of the raw material into the United
Kingdom from both member and non-member states.
c. EU Law Supplemental to National Law
Article 114(1) allows the European Council to write regulations to
harmonize law across the several member states in order to further the operations
191
of the common internal market.
In Spain v. Council of the European Union, the
Spanish government challenged the ability of the EU to write supranational laws,
192
in the form of regulations, in the field of patent law.
Here, Spain contested
Regulation 1768/92, which created a “supplementary protection certificate” for
medical products that were subject to a national law patent right in order to give
193
those medicinal producing firms an extended time period of protection.
The
European Council, invoking its powers under Article 95(1), promulgated the
regulation upon evidence that the bulk of medicinal research was being conducted
in the United States and Japan because of the more favorable intellectual property
194
protection afforded by those countries.
The problem that medicinal research
firms faced was that although the patent for the product could be obtained
relatively quickly, the license to market the product took longer and thus the real
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195

time of the patent was shorter.
The EU Council believed that the only way to
improve the condition of medical research in the EU member states was to create
196
the supplemental certificate that would attach to the national law-granted patent.
Spain challenged the regulation, arguing that the EU did not have the power
to regulate commercial and industrial property pursuant to Article 36, which gives
197
Although Spain cited
the member states the ability to protect such property.
198
several cases in support of its position, the Court stated, “The case-law has not
excluded the possibility of the Community determining by legislation the
conditions and rules regarding the protection conferred by industrial property
199
rights, should such action prove necessary in pursuing its objectives.”
The ECJ
further stated that since the supplementary certificate was in addition to the patent,
the latter of which is the sole province of national law, the EU Council was not
200
infringing upon Article 36.
d. Language Requirements
One can only imagine that in a trading bloc with twenty-seven member
states, it is likely that differences in languages can inhibit the trade of products
possessing intellectual property rights. In BASF AG v. Prasident des Deutschen
Patentamts, the ECJ upheld a provision requiring that patent applications be filed
in the member state’s language against a claim by a patent holder that such a rule
201
violated Articles 34 and 36 of the TFEU.
Pursuant to the European Patent
Convention (“EPC”), if the owner of a patent seeks patent protection in one of the
EPC member states, the applicant must file an application in the language of the
202
particular country in which the applicant seeks protection.
If the applicant does
not submit an application translated into the language of the EPC member state to
which the applicant seeks protection within three months of filing with the
European Patent Office, the country in which the applicant sought protection can
203
declare the application void ab initio.
BASF, the owner of a patent for a paint
sealer for automobiles, after having been told by the German government that the
patent would not be valid in Germany because the firm did not file an application
in German, argued that the EPC’s language requirement amounted to a restriction
204
that was not compatible with Articles 28 and 30.
Specifically, BASF contended that the costs of translating applications is so
high that firms seeking intellectual property protection are forced to choose
carefully the member states to which patent protection is realized and thus the
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patent applicant will unfairly lose protection in some EU member states.
BASF
also argued that the language requirement forced an intolerable division of the
European market in the face of Articles 28 and 30 by way of a property protected
206
zone and a free zone whereby any innovator can copy the patented product.
According to BASF, there were two disastrous consequences of the division—that
licensees and competitors in the free zone would commit an act of infringement if
they exported the patented product from the protected zone into the free zone and
that the patent holder would be unable to market the protected goods in the free
zone for fear of a parallel import that would threaten the higher prices in the
207
protected zone.
While finding no violation of Articles 34 or 36, the ECJ stated that the
expense associated with filing a patent application in the appropriate language is
just one of several factors, among many others, that a patent applicant must
208
consider in determining in which countries to establish patent rights.
The Court
did not find the language requirement, or the consequences of the language
209
requirement, to be a true obstacle to intra-EU trade.
e. Licensing Agreements
In most instances, Articles 34, 36, 101, and 102 work together to promote the
free movement of goods protected by intellectual property rights across the EU
member states. However, in Bayer AG v. Heinz Süllhöfer, the ECJ found a point
210
of contention between Articles 34 and 101.
The facts of the case are compelling. Bayer AG had obtained a patent for a
process to manufacture panels and sheeting made up of foam materials and
Süllhöfer had obtained a patent for a conveyor-belt system to manufacture foam211
based panels.
Bayer AG, Süllhöfer, and a third firm, Hennecke, had engaged in
a lengthy litigation process that was initially concluded by an agreement involving
212
all three parties.
Under the agreement, Süllhöfer granted Bayer AG and
Hennecke a non-exclusive, free license to use its patented technology and the
ability to sub-license the technology, in addition to rights to other protected
213
property held in other member states.
In return, Bayer AG granted a nonexclusive, non-transferable license to its foam panel technology, waived any
claims of infringement by either Süllhöfer or Hennecke, and agreed not to
214
challenge the validity of the Süllhöfer patent.
The agreement, which had
provisions for royalties among the parties, effectively ended the litigation.
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However, after Süllhöfer indicated a desire to terminate the agreement, the
German courts were asked to determine whether the no-challenge clause in the
agreement violated Articles 34 and 101 as an agreement that would limit the free
215
movement of goods within the EU.
Although the German court referred the
matter to the ECJ on grounds involving both Article 34 and 101, the Court stated
the case should be decided on grounds involving Article 101 and not Article 34
since the agreement, a contract among private parties, does not amount to national
216
legislation that has enacted a barrier limiting the free movement of goods.
The Court’s jurisprudence did not end with the simple division between
Articles 28 and 81 and indeed the ECJ made several important pronouncements
about the impact of Article 81. First, the Court stated that an agreement that
includes a “no-challenge clause” among parties supported by intent to end
litigation does not infringe Article 101 so long as there are no other clauses
217
restricting competition.
Second, and related, the ECJ commented that Article 81
does not create distinctions between agreements designed to end litigation and
218
other agreements without such intent.
Third, and in contrast, the ECJ stated that
if the agreement in any way limited the freedom of action any of the parties, and
the same provision restricting freedom also restricted competition, Article 81
219
would be infringed.
Domestic courts also have had the opportunity to weigh in on the balance
between intellectual property rights and the free movement of goods while
interpreting the case law of the ECJ. In Re Patented Bandaging Material, a
German appellate court held that Articles 34 and 36 do not allow the licensee of a
patented product to reintroduce the patented product in a member state that granted
the patent rights when the patented products were first introduced in that same
member state but were moved through another member state that did not grant
220
patent rights.
In the case at bar, an American firm had licensed its bandaging product,
which was protected by both American and German patents, to the defendant for
221
sale in Germany.
The licensee, however, exported the bandaging products to its
subsidiary in Belgium, where patent rights for the bandaging products were not
222
secured by the licensor.
The subsidiary then reintroduced the bandaging
223
products into Germany through the licensee’s second subsidiary.
The German
appellate court stated that consent to sell the products in Germany directly did not
provide consent to reintroduce the same products through another member state
and thus the exhaustion of rights doctrine did not apply since the transactions,

215
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either from Germany to Belgium or from Belgium to Germany, were not
224
voluntary.
Furthermore, the German appellate court, after examining the
jurisprudence from the ECJ, stated that the consent between the licensor and the
licensee did not reach the threshold whereby Articles 34 and 36 would require
225
intellectual property rights to be waived in favor of free movement of goods.
2.

Analysis.

The ruling in Parke-Davis should place intellectual right holders at ease at
least in one regard. Specifically, the enforcement of intellectual property rights is
not a violation of the competition provisions of Articles 101 and 102. For the ECJ
to rule otherwise, intellectual property rights would be worthless. In other words,
the very fact that a party holds a patent, trademark, or copyright does not mean it
has a dominant position and enforcement is not an abuse. Few would argue that a
patent holder should not be able to bar entry of goods made from a protected
process without permission.
The ECJ, in Pharmon, made it clear that the enforcement of intellectual
property rights, especially in cases where the right holder did not consent to market
their protected goods, is not a violation of Articles, 34, 36, 101, or 102. It should
also be noted that Hoescht, the plaintiff in Pharmon, may also have a breach of
contract action against their licensee for taking the product into another member
state without permission. It is not clear as to whether this is an effective remedy.
In this regard, intellectual property right holders should take special note of the
outcome in Re Patented Bandaging Material which prohibits licensees from
claiming protection under Articles 34, 36, 101, and 102 when they breach their
licensing agreements and take the licensor’s goods to a member state that does not
grant protection.
However, the Merck decision presents a problem that is once again rooted in
the lack of substantive harmony of patent law. Member states are free to write
their own substantive law creating intellectual property rights and, thus, it is
possible that what is patentable in one member state may not be in another member
state. Problematically, if the right holder places their protected goods in the
market place of a member state where protection does not exist, there is a
significant chance that the price will be substantially lower and parallel importers
will discover the opportunity for profit. Essentially, in such a situation, the
patent’s value is undercut even in countries where the patent holder has protection.
If the EU were to adopt a Community-wide body of substantive patent law
(or trademark or copyright law), these problems can be alleviated. With such
problems removed, the incentive to develop patent and market patented goods in
additional member states might exist. Another possible solution may be found in
Spain v. Council of the European Union. Since the ECJ upheld the Council of the
European Union’s ability to draft laws that are supplemental to the domestic
intellectual property law of member states, the Council could use this authority to
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create intellectual property rights in member states that will not create them such
as in the Merck case.
B. Free Movement, Competition, and Trademarks
1.

Case Law

a. Parallel Imports
226
In the famous, precedent setting cases of Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug
227
and Centrafarm BV v. Winthrop BV,
the ECJ determined that trademark and
patent rights cannot inhibit the resale of a product trademarked and patented back
into the country of origin where the rights were held once the right holder had
agreed to market the product in a country where the importer (reseller) had
lawfully purchased the product in the export country. Sterling Drug and its
subsidiary, Winthrop BV, held trademark and patent rights in the United Kingdom
for an anti-urinary tract infection drug called Negram and marketed the product in
228
the Netherlands.
Centrafarm, the defendant in both cases, bought the drug in
large quantities in the Netherlands and resold them in the United Kingdom at a
229
lower price.
When the product was resold in the United Kingdom by
230
Centrafarm, it had the Negram trademark and it was the same product.
Sterling Drug and Winthrop tried to assert that their British trademark and
patent rights could limit the ability of Centrafarm to resell the Negram product in
231
The crux of the case was whether Article 34 would bar
the United Kingdom.
the use of these rights as “quantitative restrictions on imports” or if these rights, as
asserted, were within the confines of Article 36 thus allowing for the “protection of
232
industrial and commercial property.”
Although the ECJ stated that member states can place some limitations on
the parallel importer pursuant to Article 36, the Court held that to allow intellectual
property rights to completely trump the parallel importer’s rights to resell the
233
product in the country of origin would frustrate the Treaty.
The Court stated
that if the right holder was able to bar the reentry of the products, by asserting
either trademark or patent rights, it would essentially be able to “control the outlets
234
of the product in the Community.”
Additionally, the Court believed that the
purpose of intellectual property rights is not to interfere with the “principles of a
235
Community system.”
The Court likened these circumstances to those in
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Deutsche Grammophon, in that the right holder had agreed to market its product in
236
another member state.
The Court of Justice of the European Free Trade Association Court (“EFTA
Court”) is no stranger to the same issues that have faced the ECJ regarding the
exhaustion of intellectual property rights. The EFTA Court is bound by the EU’s
237
Directive 89/104/EEC on such matters.
However, in Mag Instrument, the EFTA
Court was faced with the question of whether the exhaustion of intellectual
property rights, which was generally applied at a national level, should be applied
238
on an international level when ECJ jurisprudence was silent on the matter.
Mag Instrument, the plaintiff in the case at bar, was an American
manufacturer of flashlights which are sold around the world, as well as the owner
of a registered trademark in Norway and many other countries for the “Maglite”
239
brand.
At the time of the case, Mag Instrument had only authorized one
240
importer for Norway.
The defendant had brought the trademarked flashlights
241
into Norway through parallel import for sale.
Mag Instrument filed suit against
the defendant in a Norwegian court with a request that the defendant be prohibited
242
from selling the Maglite flashlights. The chief argument by the plaintiff was that
the defendant’s unauthorized act of bringing the flashlights into Norway for sale
243
violated Article 7 of Directive 89/104/EEC.
The defendant contended that
international exhaustion of trademark rights is a requirement of Directive
244
89/104/EEC.
After reminding a reader of its opinion that the EEA (and thus the EFTA
Court) is bound by Articles 34 and 36 of the TFEU, the EFTA Court stated that,
according to ECJ jurisprudence, Article 34 does not prohibit a trademark holder
from asserting rights to block entry into the EEA of, nor does it prohibit the
245
marketing of, trademarked products that are coming in from a non-EEA country.
Furthermore, the EFTA Court stated that the ECJ has decided that, at a minimum
under Article 7 of Directive 89/104/EEC, the exhaustion of rights doctrine applies
246
to the jurisdiction of any member state within the EEA.
However, the EFTA
Court also stated that the ECJ had not commented on whether Article 7 prohibits
member states from writing national laws that allow for international exhaustion of
247
rights.
If the EFTA Court were to allow EEA member states to adopt
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international exhaustion rules, then Norway could write laws that would allow the
defendant to bring into that country any goods that have been sold anywhere in the
world. In the end, the EFTA Court held that Article 7 of Directive 89/104/EEC did
not require member states to adopt only EEA-wide exhaustion rules and thus did
not prohibit EEA member states from adopting such international exhaustion
248
legislation.
Perhaps more important than the holding in Mag Instrument was the
reasoning behind the decision. According to the EFTA Court, international
exhaustion promotes the interest of free trade and competition and, in turn,
promotes the interests of consumers since many merchants will be able to bring
trademarked goods into an EEA member state and prices for such goods will
249
decrease.
The EFTA Court also stated that the functions of a trademark, to
allow consumers to identify products and force producers to establish goodwill, are
250
not hampered by the international exhaustion of rights doctrine.
Additionally,
the EFTA Court stated that its decision was in line with EEA Agreement and the
251
TRIPS Agreement.
A similar issue arose in Silhouette International v. Hartlauer whereby the
ECJ held that member states cannot write legislation that provides for exhaustion
of trademark rights as they attach to products placed outside the EEA even with the
consent of the trademark holder, but also stated that Article 7 of Directive
89/104/EC does not provide the trademark holder with a right to bar the reentry of
252
parallel imports into a member state where the same goods are sold.
The fact pattern in Silhouette International was similar to that of Mag
Instrument. The plaintiff, Silhouette International, an Austria-based maker of
expensive, high-end glasses and frames sold a consignment of “out-of-fashion”
frames to a reseller in Bulgaria with express directions that they be resold in
253
Bulgaria or former USSR republics.
Hartlauer, the defendant and a firm
successful at selling items at low prices, purchased the glasses and brought them to
254
Austria and advertised their sale.
Silhouette sought an injunction in the Austrian
courts to prohibit Hartlauer’s marketing and sale of the trademarked goods,
contending that such an advertising campaign would harm Silhouette’s high-end
255
image.
Specifically, Silhouette argued that it could assert its registered
trademark in Austria to prohibit the parallel importation and sale of its trademarked
goods since the consignment sold to the Bulgarian reseller was not a sale in the
EEA and that trademark rights are not exhausted unless the goods have been
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256

placed inside the EEA.
After the Austrian trial court applied the doctrine of
international exhaustion pursuant to Austrian law and found that Silhouette’s rights
were exhausted as soon as the goods were on sale, regardless of where the goods
are sold, the Austrian appellate court referred the matter to the ECJ for an
257
interpretation of Article 7.
Hartlauer did not argue that Directive 89/104/EEC
required international exhaustion of trademark rights regardless of where the goods
are sold, but only that member states are free to adopt international exhaustion
258
principles.
The Court began its analysis by stating that Article 7’s exhaustion clause
259
Directive 89/104/EEC, the
only applies to goods that are placed in the EEA.
Court said, is designed to safeguard the internal market, and there is a risk of
allowing some member states to provide for international exhaustion while others
260
did not.
According to the Court, the possibility of differences in domestic law
on this point could create distortion in competition among the member states,
261
which is the absolute opposite of the EU’s mission.
However, and somewhat puzzling, the ECJ also left plaintiffs like Silhouette
without a remedy in regard to the parallel importation reality. When asked by the
Austrian courts to determine whether a trademark holder can use Article 7 of
Directive 89/104/EEC to gain an injunction against a third party seller from selling
(and thus using the trademark) the goods in an EEA member state once the
trademark holder voluntarily consented to a sale of those goods outside the EEA,
262
the ECJ answered negatively.
According to the Court, Article 7 imposes a limit
263
on member states, not on individual parties.
b. Repackaging
Parallel imports that are repackaged constitute one of the most challenging
issues that affect the balance between intellectual property rights and the free
movement of goods. In Pfizer v. Eurim-Pharm GmbH, the Court stated that a
trademark right cannot be asserted to prevent the entry of pharmaceuticals even
when the importer purchases the right holder’s product and repackages it for resale
264
in another state.
The defendant in this case, Eurim-Pharm, purchased the
plaintiff’s pharmaceutical, “Vibramycin,” and repackaged it for resale in
265
Germany.
The repackaging activity included a process whereby the “blister
strips,” as created by Pfizer, were manually altered so that Eurim-Pharm could
266
repackage them into smaller sizes.
At no time were the actual “blisters” opened
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but, when packaged, the consumer could see the “Vibramycin” name through the
267
clear packaging created by Eurim-Pharm.
Pfizer held a trademark right under British law and was exporting/importing
268
Therefore,
the product to Germany under the Pfizer name through a subsidiary.
this became a parallel imports issue since Pfizer had previously agreed to the sale
269
of Vibramycin in Germany. After citing the Centrafarm v. Winthrop case, the
ECJ found that Article 36 did not create an exception to the Article 34 ban on
270
quantitative restrictions, as applied in this case.
Perhaps making Eurim-Pharm’s
case stronger was its ability to show that the repackaging efforts were in line with
271
the practices of German doctors.
However, the ECJ did set some limits in its
ruling. It required that (1) the repacking be limited to the outer wrapping, (2) the
272
original trade mark still be visible,
(3) the new package must state that new
packaging had taken place, and (4) the trademark right holder still controls where
273
the product is sold.
However, in a more recent case also involving repackaging activity by
274
Eurim-Pharm, the ECJ ruled that where the repackaging could affect the actual
product, remove vital information or damage the reputation of the product
manufacturer, a right holder could assert trademark rights to prevent the
275
repackaging and resale of their product.
Under such circumstances, Article 36
276
creates an exception to Article 34.
In this case, there was evidence that EurimPharm’s repackaging process obliterated the batch numbers printed on the original
277
package, which could endanger consumer health.
The decision by the ECJ in Boehringer Ingelheim v. Swingward is perhaps
278
In this case,
the best articulation of the applicable rules in such cases.
Boehringer Ingelheim brought suit against Swingward for trademark infringement
after the latter had purchased several of the former’s medicinal products that were
sold, under several trademarks, in several member states and then imported them
279
into the United Kingdom after repackaging them.
In repackaging the medicinal
products, Swingward left the original trademark exposed, with the addition of
Swingward’s name, repackaging the products in a way that required Swingward to

267
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269
Case 15/74, Centrafarm BV v. Withrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. 1183, 1184.
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reproduce the Boehringer Ingelheim’s trademark.
In some situations Boehringer
Ingelheim’s trademark was not visible and only the generic name of the medicinal
281
product was exposed.
Boehringer Ingelheim opposed all three categories of
repackaging, as well as the altering of the leaflets associated with the medicinal
products, claiming that all of Swingward’s actions constituted trademark
infringement and, thus, the repackaged products could not be parallel imported into
282
the United Kingdom.
The ECJ’s decision is not only important for the rules it set forth in regard to
repackaging, the free movement of goods, and parallel imports, but also for its
articulation of the power and meaning behind a proprietor’s trademark. The Court
began by stating that the purpose of a trademark is to signify the origin of a
product and when a product is repackaged in a parallel import such a guarantee of
283
origin is jeopardized.
Because of that threat, the ECJ remarked that what is
most important in determining whether trademark infringement exists is whether
the repackaging is prejudicial to the trademark and not whether there are actually
284
negative effects realized in the market place.
However, the Court also
commented that a trademark holder cannot claim there is a threat to origin of
source and reputation merely because the trademarked goods have been
repackaged, as to do so would create an infringement of Article 34 and Directive
285
89/104/EEC as a disguised restriction on trade.
The trademark holder can assert
trademark rights to prohibit the parallel importation of a repackaged good if the
286
original condition of the product is altered.
The ECJ, while still attempting to strike a balance between intellectual
property rights and the free movement of goods, articulated a duty on behalf of the
parallel importer to give notice to the trademark holder that the repackaged product
287
is being placed on sale in a member state.
The parallel importer must also
supply the trademark holder with a sample of the repackaging before it goes on
288
sale.
According to the Court, this protective measure will allow the trademark
holder to determine whether the original product is being harmed or whether the
presentation of the packaging could harm the trademark owner’s reputation or the
289
reputation of the product.
However, the Court did state that if the repackaging is
necessary for the parallel importation to be successful and the trademark
290
proprietor’s interests are protected, the repacking is likely to be allowed.
The
burden is on the parallel importer to show that its repackaging does not harm the

280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290

Id. ¶ 7.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 6–8.
Id. ¶ 14.
Id. ¶ 15.
Id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 20.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 30.

2012

FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

79

291

reputation of the trademark holder or its product.
The ECJ was specific as to what could harm the reputation of the trademark
holder. The Court stated that the repackaging could harm the trademark owner’s
reputation if it is “not defective, of poor quality, or untidy” so long as it detracts
292
from the image of the mark.
In addition, if the parallel importer does not affix
the trademark to the exterior repackaging, or wholly or partially obscures the
trademark, or reprints the trademark in capital letters, the parallel importer also
threatens the trademark holder’s reputation.294
c. Trademark Similarity
Trademark infringement cases that arise from conflicts between Articles 34
and 36 are not limited to situations whereby one firm makes the product and
another firm buys it and resells it in another state (parallel imports). Indeed,
problems can arise when similar trademarks are used for different products. In
293
Terrapin Overseas Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie CA, a German, plaster products
294
firm under the name of Terranova tried to assert its trademark right to block the
entry of pre-fabricated houses marketed by a British firm, Terrapin, who also held
295
a trademark for their business name in the United Kingdom.
In the German
trademarks register, the objects of the German right holder were listed as
“Manufacture of dry prepared plaster, construction work and trade in building
296
materials.”
The ECJ, in Terrapin, found that the German right holder could block the
entry of the British-named product as long as there are no restrictions on the
297
The ECJ thus found an exception within Article 30
product entering Germany.
(ex 36) to Article 28 (ex 30) whereby two similar names in similar industries are
trademarked by different states. Advocate General Mayras noted that the Terrapin
298
firm could market its products in Germany under a different name.
The Court’s
main rationale for its opinion focused on protection of the consumer to justify the
299
validity of the Article 36 exception to Article 34.
In a 1990 case, the ECJ further defined border between permissible and
impermissible conduct in regard to the assertion of intellectual property rights and
the Treaty. In S.A. Cnl-Sucal NV v. Hag GF AG (Sucal), the Court stated that
since the Treaty was not designed to lay down an extensive set of rules governing
intellectual property, it was up to the Court, and has been for some time, to outline
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300

the interests of the TFEU.
In Sucal, the Court wrestled with the question of whether the trademark of
“HAG,” held by the German decaffeinated coffee maker “HAG Bremen,” could be
asserted against its competitor “HAG Belgium” when the latter entered the
301
German market.
HAG Bremen contended that its brand of decaffeinated coffee
was superior in quality and processing and that the HAG Belgium label would
302
confuse consumers in Germany into buying a lesser quality product.
According
to the Advocate General, the legal question was whether the enforcement of HAG
Bremen’s trademark in Germany would violate Article 34’s “prohibitions or
303
restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit.”
In contrast, Article 36
allows for the protection of “industrial and commercial property.”
The Advocate General returned to the basic premise that “[t]he exclusive
right conferred on the owner of intellectual property is exhausted in relation to the
products in question when he puts them into circulation anywhere within the
304
common market.”
Further, the Court added that a right holder cannot rely on
the domestic intellectual property grant to block the importation of a product that
305
has been legally marketed in another state.
However, these traditional issues were met by a new twist: the “common
origin” principle. The common origin principle is based on the idea that it is
possible that two similar or identical marks having common ancestry could be
306
owned by different persons in different states.
Under the common origin
principle, neither of the right holders may assert protection to keep the other from
307
marketing its product in the other’s state.
The Advocate General went to great lengths to describe the value of a
308
309
In its
trademark in finding that the doctrine of common origin did not apply.
ruling, the Court believed that the trademarks were too similar and could lead to
310
confusion by the consumer due to both sound and design.
The Court stated that
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there was a fine line between the prohibitions in Article 34, where a broad view
could be dangerous, and the allowances under Article 36, where a narrow view
311
could be likewise as dangerous.
d. Counterfeit Goods
In Adidas AG, the ECJ was faced with a decision of whether a national law
prohibiting the disclosure of a counterfeiter of goods caught by customs officials at
312
the Swedish border should prevail over a EU regulation to the contrary.
The
Swedish customs officials had believed that a declarant of goods attempting to
bring them into the country was engaged in the counterfeiting of sports apparel, in
313
violation of Adidas’ Swedish trademark rights.
Adidas demanded the identity of
the declarant/owner of the goods so that the former could bring an action against
314
the latter for trademark infringement.
The Swedish authorities refused citing a
national law prohibiting the conveyance of such information on the grounds that it
315
violated the protections afforded to data protection.
Regulation 3295/94 states that “the decision granting the application by the
holder of the right shall be forwarded immediately to the customs offices of the
member states which are liable to be with the goods alleged in the application to be
316
counterfeit or pirated.”
This provision of the Regulation is designed to support
the trademark holder’s right across the member states. Indeed, Article 1 of the
same regulation orders customs officials to take action when goods are suspected
317
of being counterfeit or pirated.
The ECJ’s decision could be construed to hold that the Swedish law was in
318
After considering the concerns of the Swedish
conflict with the regulation.
legislature that a person’s identity, even that of a counterfeiter, should be
protected, the Advocate General stated that these concerns should yield to the
needs of the trademark right holder “when there are already serious suspicions that
the goods which are subject to customs control are not genuine . . . . [and, the]
competent administrative authorities consider that those goods ‘correspond to the
319
description of the counterfeit or pirated goods.’”
e. Private Agreements
Article 101 can be used to prohibit an agreement between two private
entities, one of which holds an intellectual property right, if that agreement
320
potentially restricts trade.
The ECJ ruled that a private agreement between two

311
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firms, that includes a no-challenge clause violates Article 101 if, although,
designed to remove the possibility of confusion by consumers in a given market,
321
the agreement creates an imbalance of responsibilities between the two parties.
The applicant, BAT, at one time held a trademark right in Germany for its sales of
322
“curly cut tobacco,” used for pipe smoking, under the name “Dorcet.”
However, BAT allowed its trademark to expire and even asked the German
323
government to remove it from the trademark registry.
Segers, a Dutch firm,
attempted to sell its tobacco product, “fine cut tobacco,” a close cousin of “curly
rolled” and used for hand-rolled cigarettes, in Germany under the name “Toltecs,”
324
which in the German language could cause confusion with Dorcet.
BAT
objected to the use of the Toltecs name and, in order to avoid lengthy and
expensive litigation, Segers signed a delimitation agreement that included a nochallenge clause removing the possibility that Segers would later challenge the
325
agreement with BAT to limit its tobacco sales to “curly cut tobacco.”
Segers’ primary argument was that the private agreement possessed a
326
The
mistake and desiring to sell fine cut tobacco rather than curly cut tobacco.
European Commission later found for Segers, concluding that the agreement
327
signed by the two parties amounted to a violation of Article 101.
The ECJ, in
rejecting most of BAT’s arguments, found that the agreement created too many
restrictions on the ability of Segers to export their tobacco product into Germany
and that all BAT had to do to perform the contract was to agree not to challenge
328
Segers’ importation of fine cut tobacco.
Additionally, the ECJ found evidence
that BAT had interfered with the relationship between Segers and the latter’s
329
distributors through the agreement.
Just as important, however, the ECJ hinted
that the agreement might have been acceptable with fewer restrictions and a greater
330
balance of responsibilities.
f. Damage to Reputation
The ECJ returned to its line of thinking found in Class International when
deciding Parfum Christian Dior SA v. Evora BV (hereinafter Christian Dior) by
stating early in the decision that, in order to assist in the uniform application of EU
law, the national courts have a duty to refer cases to the Court, and inclusive within
the category of national courts is the Benelux Court, which was designed to serve
331
as a court for Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and Belgium.

321

Id. at 388.
Id. at 364.
323
Id.
324
Id.
325
Id.
326
Id. at 370.
327
Id. Article 101 was formerly Article 85.
328
Id.
329
Id. at 371.
330
Id.
331
Case C-337/95, Parfums Christian Dior SA v. Evora BV, 1997 E.C.R. I-6013, ¶ 24, at I-6043, ¶
25, at I-I-6044.
322

2012

FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

83

In Christian Dior, the ECJ returned to the issue of the rights of a trademark
owner under the European trademark Directive (89/104/EEC). Plaintiff Christian
Dior, a French firm and the owner of several trademarks and copyrights, developed
and produced several lines of perfume products and marketed them through
332
wholly-controlled subsidiaries and allowed for retailing on a selective basis.
Defendant Evora was a retailer that resold Christian Dior products retail outlets
333
and used the Christian Dior marks in order to advertise the products.
The
plaintiff sued Evora BV for trademark infringement in a Dutch court contending
that Evora’s marketing of the plaintiff’s trademarks harmed the marks’ “luxurious
334
and prestigious image.”
Specifically, Christian Dior sought an order to prohibit
Evora from using its trademarks in its publications, catalogs, brochures,
335
advertisements, and reproductions.
Article 7 of Directive 89/104/EEC, the chief directive on trademarks within
the EU, allows for a trademark holder to prohibit the use of its trademarks, even
when the holder has voluntarily placed the product in the member state, when the
user of the mark changed the condition of the goods or has impaired the goods
336
after they are placed on the market.
Christian Dior argued that Article 7 should
include the “mental image” of the goods so far as that when the user of the mark
uses the goods in a way that impairs the image and allure of the luxury surrounding
337
the goods, the trademark holder should be able to limit the use of its mark.
Evora, in contrast, asserted that Articles 34 and Article 36 curtail the ability of
Christian Dior as a trademark owner to limit Evora’s use of the mark for the
338
products it sells.
The ECJ stated that the exhaustion of rights, as established by Articles 34,
36, and the Directive, includes the ability to market and advertise trademarked
goods once they have been sold into the marketplace and thus the user of the
trademark has the right under EU law to garner the attention of the consumer
339
public in order to sell more of the same goods in the future.
The Court
conceded Evora’s argument that without such an extension of the exhaustion of
rights doctrine in place, it would be very difficult to commercialize goods that are
340
protected by intellectual property rights.
The ECJ acknowledged, however, the concerns of trademark owners, such as
Christian Dior. The Court stated that in situations like the case in point, courts
must strike a balance between the interests of the trademark owner who seeks to
protect the strength and allure of its mark and the interests of resellers who might
use the trademark in a way that damages the reputation of the goods and advertise
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the goods in ways that are customary to that particular industry sector.
The ECJ
found that even when the reseller obtains the goods by way of a parallel import and
markets those trademarked goods along with other items that, although
comparable, are not of the same perceived quality as the trademarked goods in
question, the trademark owner cannot prohibit the reseller’s advertising use of the
342
trademark unless the advertising seriously damages the reputation of the goods.
According to the ECJ, this is also true if the advertising scheme is different than
343
that of the trademark owner’s approved retailers.
A more difficult question in Christian Dior arose in regard to both trademark
rights and copyrights associated with the owner’s packaging materials and whether
the trademark owner can assert rights under Article 36 to limit the use of the
packaging material or whether the trademark owner would be prohibited in doing
344
so under Article 34.
The ECJ stated that, in principle, the exercise of
intellectual property rights in such a case would be a violation of Article 34 as a
quantitative restriction, and thus, the only question left was whether the assertion
of rights could be excused under Article 36 pursuant to the protection of industrial
345
and commercial property clause.
The ECJ held that Article 36 does not allow
for an exception to allow a right holder to block the use of packaging material that
is protected by both trademark and copyright, as the user who lawfully obtains the
346
goods has a right to further commercialization of the products.
Peak Holding v. Axolin-Elinor AB sheds additional light on the rights of
trademark owners under Articles 5 and 7 of Directive 89/104/EEC, which is the
347
Peak Holding, the plaintiff, was a Danish firm that
directive on trademarks.
owned the “Peak Performance” trademark for clothing and other accessories in
348
Sweden and many other countries.
The defendant, Axolin-Elinor, was a
Swedish firm that had obtained Peak Performance gear through both parallel
349
import activities and re-import activities.
In addition to reselling the Peak
Performance garments, the defendant also advertised the clothing items at a fifty
350
percent discount.
This led the plaintiff to file suit in a Swedish court requesting
that Axolin-Elinor be enjoined from further use of the plaintiff’s marks, that
Axolin-Elinor pay damages, and that the clothing items held by the defendant be
351
seized and destroyed.
There was disagreement between the parties as to the
352
source of the goods.
Plaintiff argued that the goods were offered for final sale
only in Copenhagen at the plaintiff’s shops and the defendant argued that the
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353

source of the goods comprised several independent resellers.
Similar to the
argument made by Christian Dior, Peak Holding argued that the marketing
354
methods chosen by Axolin-Elinor infringed Peak Holding’s trademark rights.
In contrast to Evora’s more passive approach in Christian Dior, AxolinElinor made several arguments in opposition to Peak Holding’s exercise of
355
First, the defendant argued that
trademark rights under Directive 89/104/EEC.
the trademarked goods were voluntarily placed in the EEA when the goods cleared
356
customs and the plaintiff intended to sell the goods in the EEA.
Second,
Axolin-Elinor argued that the goods were placed in the EEA when the goods were
357
offered by independent resellers.
Third, the defendant argued that the goods
were placed in the EEA when the plaintiff began marketing the goods in the
358
plaintiff’s retail stores.
And fourth, the goods were placed in the EEA market
when the plaintiff sold a consignment of garments to an exclusive reseller with
express instructions that the exclusive reseller not be able to resell the goods in
359
countries other than Russia, Slovenia, and a small quantity in France.
Although
Peak Holdings contended that the exhaustion of rights doctrine did not apply when
its trademarked goods were merely offered for sale, it also argued that, even if the
exhaustion doctrine did apply, the doctrine was lifted and the trademark rights
were restored when the unsold quantities were returned to the plaintiff’s
360
warehouse.
While engaged in its analysis, the ECJ stated clearly that Directive
89/104/EEC created a complete harmonization of the rules relating to the rights of
trademark holders and that a uniform definition of “put on the market,” which is
found in Article 7 of the Directive and is also the point in time whereby exhaustion
361
of trademark rights occurs, is necessary.
The ECJ held that merely placing the
goods in the EEA and offering them for sale does not meet the standard of putting
the goods on the market, and thus, does not give non-trademark owners the ability
362
to use the trademarks when selling the goods.
Instead, the Court held that goods
363
are placed in the market when a first sales transaction occurs.
According to the
Court, merely importing the goods is not consistent with the Article 7 definition of
364
placing the goods in the market to trigger the exhaustion doctrine.
The Court was left with the issue of whether the agreement between Peak
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Holdings and the exclusive reseller, in conjunction with that agreements’
stipulation that the trademarked goods would only be sold in certain countries, met
the definition of placing the goods on the market under Article 7 of Directive
89/104/EEC. The ECJ stated that the exhaustion of rights requires some form of
consent by the trademark holder, and when the trademark owner consents by
agreement to provide a consignment of clothing to an exclusive reseller, the goods
are voluntarily placed in the market and the exhaustion of intellectual property
rights occurs precluding the trademark owner from interfering with the resale of
365
the goods after they are in the possession of the exclusive reseller.
It does not
matter that the agreement between the trademark owner and the exclusive reseller
366
limits the territory by which the trademarked goods may be resold.
2.

Analysis

Simply stated, if the holder of a trademark voluntarily places its protected
products in a member state, a parallel importer may bring the goods back into the
originating member state without fear of intellectual property rights serving as a
367
barrier.
This is true even if the parallel importer repackages the goods or
368
decides to retail them at a discount rate or through a discount retailer.
Free
movement principles are also espoused by the European Free Trade Area Court
369
and thus the entirely of the European Economic Area.
One can only imagine the potential damage that can be done to the reputation
of a trademark holder if repackaged goods prove to be faulty in some way or are
sullied by a discount retailer. Despite those concerns, however, the ECJ still
prefers free movement principles. This philosophy does hold true to the promise
of the common market that free movement practices will make the European
economy more efficient be allowing market participants to find ways to reduce
370
costs while making a profit.
Therefore, if a parallel importer believes that
goods, be they protected by intellectual property rights or otherwise, can be
repackaged and sold at a profit it will be able to do so as long as no damage to the
reputation or integrity to the trademark occurs. Such principles may also stimulate
different marketing strategies by the right holders in markets where parallel
imports can be spawned. In other words, the holder of the trademark rights may
repackage the goods for profit in markets where it makes sense to do so. An issue
for greater exploration, but beyond the scope of this work, is at what point the
repackaging does significant harm to the trademark’s reputation and/or at what
point the repackaging has damaged the goods subject to the trademark allowing for
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an Article 36 barrier to arise to parallel importing.
The potential for damage to the reputation of a trademark is when protected
items are sold by, and advertised by, discount retailers. One the one hand,
trademark holders may look at the situation from the viewpoint that these goods
would not have been sold at all because they are out of vogue and the discount
venue is one last chance to make profit. On the other hand, it may be that the
discounted, out of vogue goods serve as a rival to newer, in vogue goods that
might suffer in sales due to the availability of the discounted items. Trademark
holders in this situation may seek to advertise the differences between the in vogue
and out of vogue items in order to protect the newly produced items from the older
items. The Christian Dior and Peak Holding cases set a foundation for the
371
discount retailing market within the European Economic Area.
The common ancestry of trademarks is a challenging reality in the EU. On a
continent with dozens of languages, trademarks of similar sound and design are
likely to arise in ways that are innocent of infringement. In such cases, the ECJ
372
has still maintained its preference for the free movement of goods.
At worst,
one party may not be able to use its preferred trademark in a particular member
state in order to avoid confusion, but that same party cannot be blocked from
bringing the goods into the member state if the party is willing to use another
trademark.
A limitation on the free movement of goods is the possibility of counterfeit
goods. The ECJ does not allow Article 34 to limit attempts by right holders to end
the movement of counterfeit goods, but allows for the discovery of the names of
those who have engaged in counterfeiting activities.
C. Free Movement, Competition, and Copyright
1.

Case Law

a. Parallel Imports
Perhaps the best articulation by the ECJ of the rivalry between intellectual
property law and the mission of the TFEU is found in Deutsche Grammophon
373
Gesellschaft v. Metro-SB-Grossmarkete.
This case not only observed the
balance between national intellectual property rights, in this case German
copyright law, and the prohibitions on trade restraint, but also the potential for
intellectual property rights to create unacceptable trade restraints in violation of
Article 101 of the TFEU. The German plaintiff, Deutsche Grammophon
(“Deutsche”) held copyrights pursuant to German law and distributed records by
agreement to retailers through contracts stipulating that the retailers must abide by

371
Case C-337/95, Parfums Christian Dior SA v. Evora BV, 1997 E.C.R. I-6013, ¶ 46, I-6049–50;
Case C-16/03, Peak Holding v. Axolin-Elinor AB, 2004 E.C.R. I-11313, ¶¶ 54, 56, I-11346–47.
372
Case 119/75, Terrapin (Overseas), Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie CA Kapferer & Co., 1976
E.C.R. 1039, 1062.
373
Case C-78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmarkete GmbH &
Co., 1971 E.C.R. 487, 1 C.M.L.R. 631 (1971).
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374

Deutsche’s price schedule.
The agreements also required that the records, if
acquired by a third party, could only be imported from another country with
375
permission from Deutsche Grammophon.
The evidence indicated that Deutsche
376
only gave consent if the third party agreed to the price structure.
In order to
maintain a tight grip on the distribution of their records abroad, Deutsche would
377
only distribute throughout Europe through its subsidiaries.
The French distribution subsidiary owned by Deutsche was Polydor, which
378
Metro distributed the
was later purchased by Metro-SB-Grossmarkte (“Metro”).
records in issue until a disagreement over the price structure dissolved the business
379
relationship.
Soon after, Metro began to purchase Deutsche’s records through
the new French distributor and resold them in the German market at a price below
what Deutsche had set through its price structure agreements with other German
380
distributors.
Deutsche sought an injunction against Metro, arguing that the German grant
381
Although the Advocate
of the copyright was infringed by Metro’s activity.
General cited precedent that stated that “rights granted by a Member State to the
holder of a patent [would not be] affected by . . . Articles 85(1) and 86 of the
382
[E.E.C.] Treaty,”
it nonetheless held that the agreements and assertion of
copyright could not withstand Articles 101 and 34 and found the agreement and
383
German law in violation of the TFEU.
The ECJ focused its decision on the potential power of the copyright holder
to cordon off the market at virtually all levels and have almost absolute control of
384
interstate marketing through the enforcement of that copyright.
The ECJ also
stated that the territoriality principle, whereby the copyright holder could
theoretically assert his power throughout the member state in which he held his
right, cannot conform to the TFEU’s prohibition of such power under Article
385
101.
The Advocate General Roemer’s own words best state the rivalry between
the assertion of territoriality and the TFEU:
In view of this situation there is in fact much to be said for the view that since the
bounds of the territoriality principle are so uncertain it does not form part of the
substance of the protection. In any event this applies to the particular problem of
the present proceedings, i.e., a situation in which, as the [German Court] has held, a
legal person connected with the holder of the rights has marketed the goods in
question abroad. Here it should be decisive that the purpose of the industrial

374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385

Id. at 490.
Id. at 503.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 490.
Id.
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Id., 1 C.M.L.R at 639. Articles 85(1) and 86 are now Articles 101(1) and 102, respectively.
Id. at 506, 508. Article 101 was formerly Article 81. Article 34 was formerly Article 28.
Id. at 506.
Id. Article 101 was formerly Article 81.
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protection rights was fulfilled when the goods were first marketed, since it was
possible to use the monopolistic opportunity for gain. On the other hand, it would
undoubtedly go beyond the purpose of the protection rights conferred if the holder
was permitted to control further marketing, in particular to prohibit re-imports, and
free trade in goods was prevented. Thus in view of the proviso in Article 36, the
fundamental aims of the Treaty and the principles of the Common Market, and in
spite of the guarantee of the subsistence of industrial property rights, in a situation
such as that in the present case it may be held that the rights have been
386
extinguished, i.e., the exercise of the distribution rights is precluded.

The Advocate General Roemer’s basic premise was that under Articles 36
and 101, the territoriality principle cannot be used to inhibit the free trade of
387
goods.
The price agreement was held to constitute an inhibition against free
trade under Article 101 and the assertion of German trademark rights would not be
388
permissible under Article 36.
It is often the case that imported and exported goods are covered by more
than one source of intellectual property rights. In Dansk Supermarked v. Imerco,
the ECJ entertained a case that involved the parallel importation of goods that were
389
protected by both copyright and trademark rights.
In this case, Imerco, a group
of Danish hardware merchants, had commissioned the creation of a
commemorative china dish service set that was to be sold to Imerco members
390
only.
Imerco and the British manufacturer of the china dish sets additionally
agreed that any of the substandard china dish sets could be marketed by the British
manufacturer, but only in Britain and not in Denmark or any other Scandinavian
391
country.
The china dish sets were protected by both copyright, in regard to the
creative work of the design, and trademark rights, in regard to the Imerco name
392
affixed on the dish sets.
Dansk Supermarked, a supermarket chain in Denmark,
obtained several china dish sets in the United Kingdom and offered them for sale
in Denmark at prices substantially lower than those associated with the shipment
393
that was originally intended for Imerco members.
Imerco, upon discovering that
Dansk Supermarked was selling the china dish sets, asked the latter to cease the
sale of the products; Dansk Supermarked refused and Imerco instituted
394
proceedings against the firm.
At first glance, Dansk Supermarked seemed a traditional parallel import
case, whereby the proprietor of intellectual property rights has voluntarily allowed
the sale of a protected good in a member state (the United Kingdom) and is
protesting, through the exercise of those rights, the reintroduction of those goods

386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394

Id. at 508.
Id. at 498–500. Article 36 was formerly Article 30. Article 101 was formerly Article 81.
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into another member state (Denmark), when the proprietor has also consented to
their sale.
The ECJ began by stating that the Danish national courts cannot prohibit the
parallel importation of the china dish sets since Imerco voluntarily placed them in
395
the EU market pursuant to Articles 34 and 36 of the TFEU.
Unique to the case
was a Danish law that required firms marketing products to comply with Danish
396
competition rules that required the recognition of intellectual property rights.
However, the ECJ held that the Danish competition rules merely reflected a
prohibition on the infringement of copyrights and trademark rights, but that the
Danish competition rules could not prohibit the parallel importation of the china
397
dish sets.
In Warner Brothers v. Christiansen, a more technologically advanced case,
the ECJ held that firms who sell video cassettes of movies into the member states
can invoke their copyrights to prohibit their remake and resale after the video
398
Here, Warner Brothers held a
cassettes have been lawfully sold or rented.
copyright, recognized in several member states, for a James Bond film (and several
other films) reproduced on video cassette for purchase and rental and marketed
399
them throughout the member states.
The defendant, Christiansen, had
purchased the James Bond video cassette and advertised copies for sale in
400
Denmark with Danish subtitles.
Although the ECJ found that Warner Brothers had clearly determined which
markets to sell its copyrighted product, its rights were not exhausted at the sale of
the cassette within the particular market, and therefore, Warner Brothers could
401
assert copyright protection to enjoin the further duplication under Article 36
The Court noted that the great majority of use of video cassettes in the EU was
through rentals and that the copyright holder should have the ability to limit the
402
exploitation of its investment.
Furthermore, in comparison to the Cinetheque
403
case, the Court found no difference between a sale of the film and the rental of
404
its reproduction.
b. Royalty Payment
In Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH v. GEMA, a bizarre set of facts gave rise
to a prevailing interest found within Article 36 over the competing interests of
405
Article 34.
The ECJ heard two cases together with similar fact patterns whereby

395
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397
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398
Case C-158/86, Warner Bros. Inc. v. Christiansen, 1988 E.C.R. 2605, ¶ 19, at 2625.
399
Id. ¶ 3.
400
Id. ¶ 5.
401
Id. ¶¶ 9, 10.
402
Id. ¶ 10.
403
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an organization of composers representing those with copyrights to music tried to
enforce those copyrights to ensure the standard royalty payment recognized in
406
Germany.
GEMA, a German organization was entitled to an 8.0% royalty on
407
each record sold by the plaintiffs in Germany.
The plaintiffs, however, received
permission to sell the records in Germany by the British counterpart of GEMA,
408
MCPS, with a royalty payment of 6.25%.
GEMA argued that it was entitled to
409
the difference between the two royalty payments. The plaintiffs argued that if
such an argument were accepted, it would run afoul of Article 34, which bars
410
restrictions on imports.
The ECJ ruled that Article 36 allowed for the use of German law to force the
plaintiffs to pay the difference in royalty payments since the composers, not the
plaintiffs that manufactured the records being imported from the United Kingdom
411
to Germany, held the copyrights.
412
In G.
Royalties again were the subject matter in G. Basset v. SACEM.
Basset, the ECJ was asked to determine whether a national copyright management
organization recognized under French law could require a supplementary
mechanical reproduction fee levied on the public performances of copyrighted
413
sound recordings.
SACEM, the French organization that controlled the
copyrighted works, sued Mr. Basset, an operator of a discotheque, for back
414
payment of the agreed-to supplemental royalty.
Basset argued that such a
415
royalty violated Articles 34, 36, 101, and 102 of the TFEU.
Basset also
contended that SACEM had a de facto monopoly over the sound recordings in
regard to contract and that this created a dominant position in the market that was
also abused due to the size of the traditional royalty, which amounted to 6.60% of
the discotheque’s gross revenues, and the supplementary royalty, which amounted
416
to 1.65% of the gross revenues.
According to the ECJ, all sound recordings are products bound by the
requirement that goods move freely between member states under Article 34 and
any national legislation that would allow a national copyright management society
to block the movement of those copyrighted sound recordings would violate
417
Article 28.
However, the ECJ also stated that Article 36 allows member states
to write legislation to protect industrial and commercial property, including
copyrighted works, even if the legislation allows for the enforcement of licensing

44 (1981).
406
Id. ¶ 2.
407
Id.
408
Id.
409
Id. ¶ 3.
410
Id. ¶ 4.
411
Id. ¶¶ 9–11.
412
Case 402/85, G. Basset v. SACEM, 1987 E.C.R. 1747, ¶ 1.
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Id. ¶ 1.
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418

provisions.
With these black-letter statements behind it, the Court found that the
supplementary royalty was not assessed against the acts of importing or marketing
the goods from one member state to the next, but instead, was assessed against the
public use of the copyrighted work at discotheques, radio stations, or juke419
boxes.
The Court also found that the royalty was merely compensation to the
author for the use of the copyrighted work and was not assessed against the volume
420
of records that were sold.
In the end, the ECJ found that no violation of Articles 34, 36, and 102 were
421
Specifically, in regard to Articles 34 and 36 the Court found no
present.
violations despite the fact that national law allowed the National Intellectual
Property Right Association to institute either royalty even if the member state in
which the sound recordings were in public use did not require the same types of
422
royalties.
Addressing the claim by Basset that the composite royalty rate was an
abuse of a dominant position, thus, a violation of Article 102, the ECJ found that it
was up to the national courts to determine whether the required royalty was
423
abusive and since the French court did not believe them to be abusive.
The ECJ
adhered to the finding but warned, however, that significantly high royalties could
424
constitute the abuse of a dominant position.
c. Domestic Distribution Limit
Articles 34, 36, and 56 were used to challenge a French ban on the
distribution of copyrighted movies under copyright in Cinetheque S.A. v.
425
Federation Nationale des Cinemas Francais.
At issue in this case was a French
law that banned the selling or renting of video cassettes of any film which is
simultaneously being show or one year from the date of the authorization
426
certificate granted for the film.
Within the one-year period, Cinetheque began to
reproduce a film that was currently in circulation in France and to sell copies to
427
vendors, who would, in turn, sell them to consumers.
The plaintiffs
immediately sought an injunction in French courts to stop the duplication and
428
distribution of the film.
Cinetheque then brought a suit arguing that the French
429
statute violated the above the TFEU’s provisions.
The ECJ found that the French law did not violate Articles 34 and 35 since
importers and domestic (French) traders were being treated equally and therefore,

418
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430

there was no discrimination against imports.
Additionally, the French law did
not give distributors the ability to take advantage of the differences in legal
requirements across the member states even though the Advocate General Slynn
431
found that no similar state law existed.
Advocate General Slynn also found that Article 56’s ban on any restrictions
on the freedom to provide services within the EU was not violated by the French
law since the prohibition on the duplication and distribution for one year did not
432
amount to a “restriction.”
d. Broadcasting
Coditel v. Cine-Vog, factually, is a relatively easy case to show the power of
a copyright holder when executing a license with another party that allows for
433
distribution of a film only in one member state.
Coditel was a collection of
Belgian cable companies that had contracted with Cine-Vog to distribute and show
434
copyrighted films controlled by the latter, but only in the Belgian market.
Coditel had allowed the broadcasts to be picked up by German viewers, in breach
of the agreement with Cine-Vog, and Cine-Vog sued Coditel for back payment of
435
royalties.
Coditel argued that Articles 34, 36, 56, and 101 were violated, and
specifically, that the agreement posed an equivalent restriction on the free
movement of goods and services, and that the agreement constituted an attempt by
436
Cine-Vog to distort competition.
The ECJ made short shrift of the case holding
that the mere requirement in a copyright licensing agreement that limits the
geographical scope of broadcast rights does not violate Articles 34, 36, 56, or 101
and that Article 36 permits a member state to enforce agreements that allow for the
437
protection of commercial and industrial property as an exception to Article 34.
The Court expressed sympathy for the concerns of Cine-Vog in regard to the
importance of film distribution in the EU, whereby copyrighted works need to be
438
appropriately subtitled.
To address such concern in a license agreement was not
an attempt at distortion, and thus, Article 101 was not violated, per se, the Court
439
declared.
The ECJ did make it clear, however, that national courts must inquire
as to whether the exercise of copyrights found within licensing agreements actually
440
distort competition.
Articles 34, 36, 101, and 102 are not the sole provisions of the TFEU

430
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involved in the discussion of the balance between intellectual property rights and
the free movement of goods. Article 56 of the TFEU provides for the free
441
movement of services.
Article 106 of the TFEU requires that any revenueproducing entity created by a member state that is given exclusive rights must
442
adhere to the principles found in Articles 18, and 101-109.
In ERT v. DEP, the
ECJ made several comments about the ability of a member state to create a media
crown corporation with monopolistic power over television and radio
443
broadcasts.
The Greek government had created the Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation
(“ERT”) to maintain exclusive broadcasting over television and radio of virtually
all sounds and images broadcasted within Greece for general reception, or by
special closed or cable circuit, or any other form of circuit, and the setting up of
radio and stations and ERT was given the power to produce and exploit by any
444
means radio and television broadcasts.
Despite the exclusive rights granted to
ERT, DEP and the mayor of a Greek city launched a television station to broadcast
445
television programs.
When challenged by ERT, DEP claimed that the Greek
446
grant of authority for ERT violated Articles 34, 36, 101, and 102 of the TFEU.
The ECJ did not expressly address whether Articles 34, 36, 101, and 102
447
Instead, it answered several questions posed to it by the Greek
were violated.

441

Article 56 (formerly 49) of the Treaty states:
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on freedom to
provide services within the Community shall be prohibited in respect of nationals
of Member States who are established in a State of the Community other than
that of the person for whom the services are intended. The Council may, acting
by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, extend the
provisions of the Chapter to nationals of a third country who provide services and
who are established with the Community.

442

Article 86 of the Treaty states:
1.In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States
grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor maintain
in force any measure contrary to the rules provided for in Article 12 and Articles
81 to 89.
2. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic
interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject
to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to the rules on competition,
insofar as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law
or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade
must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the
Community.
3. The Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions of this Article
and shall, where necessary, address appropriate directives or decision to Member
States.

Id.

Id.
443

Case C-260/89, ERT v. DEP, 1991 E.C.R. I-2925.
Id. ¶ 3.
445
Id. ¶¶ 1, 4.
446
Id. DEP also contended that the Greek grant of authority violated the European Convention on
Human Rights. Id.
447
Id. ¶ 5.
444

2012

FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

95

448

courts on the subject of monopoly power regarding broadcast rights.
According
to the ECJ, its previous case law did find that the Treaty prevents member states
from removing television and radio broadcasting from the sphere of competition
and providing one entity to provide those services, but the way in which the
monopoly-empowered entity is organized or exercised can infringe Articles 101
449
and 102.
The Court stated that television broadcasts are covered by the TFEU
provisions concerning free movement of services and the materials used in
television broadcasting, namely the sound recordings, films, and other products,
450
are subject to the rules on the free movement of goods.
The ECJ further stated
that if the monopoly is granted exclusive authority to import, rent, or distribute
broadcasting material, no violation of Article 34 exists unless the monopolyempowered entity, either directly or indirectly, engages in discriminatory practices
between domestic and imported broadcast materials to the detriment of the
451
imported materials.
In regard to the free movement of services, the ECJ provided a parallel rule
to the rule regarding free movement of goods and held that the creation of a
monopoly-empowered broadcasting entity itself is not a violation of Article 56 of
the TFEU so long as the entity does not discriminate between domestic and
foreign-based (yet within the EU) broadcast services, to the detriment of the
452
latter.
According to the ECJ, the fear is that without a guarantee that the
broadcasting entity would carry broadcasts from other member states, the
453
monopoly-empowered entity would favor its own programs.
On the subject of competition law, the ECJ made it clear that Articles 101
and 102 are applicable to monopoly operations created by member states and that
these entities will be treated as a separate undertaking from the member state that
454
birthed it.
Continuing, the ECJ stated that it is possible that member state
created monopolies can have a dominant power in the market place and can abuse
455
that power under Article 102.
The ECJ remarked that member states are not free
to force the monopoly-empowered entity to engage in competition rules violations
456
under Articles 101 and 102.
e. Reproduction of Copyrighted Material
In a landmark case, in fact a consolidation of three cases collectively called
the “Magill TV Cases” that perhaps best explains the remedial powers held by the
European Commission, the ECJ upheld the ability of the European Commission to
order copyright holders to disseminate their information when their copyright

448
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amounts to a an abuse of a dominant position under Article 102.
In The Magill
TV Cases, three television broadcasters asserted their copyrights against Magill TV
as the latter took the schedules printed by each of the broadcasters and
consolidated the schedules into one magazine for consumers to purchase in Ireland
458
and Northern Ireland of the United Kingdom.
Under the two-step process required to find a violation of Article 102, a
dominant position and the abuse thereof, the ECJ found that the television
459
The dominant position was
broadcasters abused a dominant position.
substantiated by the fact that the majority of households in Ireland and as much as
forty percent of households in Northern Ireland could receive broadcasts by the
460
three television networks.
Furthermore, to allow the networks to assert their
copyrights would, in effect, give them “de facto monopoly” over the publication of
weekly television listings, placing firms like Magill, that wanted to create a new
461
product, in a state of economic reliance.
Article 36 could not save the assertion
462
of the copyrights.
2.

Analysis

A common thread exists between copyright cases and patent cases in regard
to fees that firms may have to pay to be able to successfully move products from
one member state to another. In the Musik-Vertrieb and Basset cases, the ECJ held
that those using copyrighted sound recordings even if the royalty schedules are
463
different for different member states must make royalty payments.
The ECJ,
however, maintained its free movement principles and stated that once the royalties
are paid, the sound recordings can be moved from one member state to when
464
consent exists.
The holding in these cases are similar to the holding in BASF,
above, where the ECJ held that language requirements for patent applications did
465
not violate Article 34.
The common thread in these cases seems to be that as
long as all parties, and their protected goods, are treated the same, member states
are permitted to have unique laws that might create an intellectual property
patchwork across the EU. Expenses such as royalty payments and costs associated
with preparing patent applications are not barriers since all parties operating in the
member states that have these conditions are regulating only within their member
states.
The Cinetheque case is the only case in this line that is perplexing, but only

457
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because of the possible effects. From a pure quantitative restriction viewpoint, the
ECJ is allowing for a limitation pursuant to French law where after-market
466
distribution of movies is barred for one year from the premiere date of the film.
Theoretically, the law only applies in France but would apply to French films and
films produced across the EU but premiered in France. What remains to be seen is
whether this harms the after-market film distribution industry if one or a handful of
member states truly dominate the film industry. These few countries could enact
similar laws and significantly limit the after-market film distributors’ chances at
profitability.
Similar to the concerns associated with the secondary market for film
distribution, the irregular goods industry gained significantly by the ECJ’s decision
in Dansk Supermarked. Although the plaintiffs had a significant interest in
protecting their copyright (and trademark) in regard to value, consent to market
irregular goods in another member state allows for a parallel import opportunity.
Member states that want to allow for protection of copyrights (and trademarks) in
regard to their value could require a consumer protection identification mark on the
goods that they are “irregular.” Such a maneuver could allow for the price of the
copyrighted and trademarked goods to remain at traditional levels.
The Magill TV Cases are perhaps the best example of consumer protection
that stems from Articles 34 and 102. The ability to allow a third party publisher to
create a master schedule makes it easier, and thus cheaper, for television viewers in
the EU to find their way to the show they desire. The television networks that
published the primary schedules certainly have an interest in making sure that the
republication of their schedules in the form of a master schedule is accurate. The
ECJ, in a sense, created a new industry making television viewing easier for those
living in mass markets. The case is, to a certain degree, out of line with traditional
notions of copyright protection that would usually allow for an injunction against
unauthorized use of copyrighted material, in this case, a primary television
schedule.
Intellectual property rights are designed to stoke innovation, creativity and
economic development. However, the decision in ERT v. DEP seems to allow
governments to stifle innovation, creativity, and economic development, and
perhaps worse, create conditions for censorship. In ERT v. DEP, the ECJ stated
that it is not a violation of the TFEU for governments to remove broadcasting from
467
the realm of competition and, thus, allowing for state control of media.
It seems
ironic that the EU, which is founded on an economic liberalism philosophy, would
condone such a possibility, which also prohibits television shows and movies from
entering into a member state.

466
Joined Cases 60 & 61/84, Cinetheque S.A. v. Fed’n Nationale des Cinemas Francais, 1985
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467
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D. Free Movement, Competition, and Trade Secrets
1.

Case Law

The cell phone industry continues to be an intellectual property frontier. Cell
phone technology can involve all forms of intellectual property, including patent,
copyright, trademark, and trade secrets. In T-Mobile NV v. Raad van besuur, the
ECJ ruled that the revelation of trade secrets among competitors that leads to an
468
agreement that restricts competition can lead to an infringement of Article 101.
The T-Mobile case, factually, sounds like a traditional European
“competition” case or American “antitrust” case. The five operators of cell phone
service in the Netherlands met to discuss the reduction of standard dealer
remunerations for post-paid cell phone subscriptions and, according to the
evidence discovered in the Dutch courts, confidential information was discussed
469
and exchanged and a date for the agreement was adopted.
The Dutch courts
found that the five parties had engaged in a concerted effort in violation of Dutch
470
law and Article 101 of the TFEU, and all five parties were fined for their action.
The ECJ made several statements about the potential violation of Article 101
pursuant to a willing exchange of corporate information among competitors.
According to the ECJ, the purpose of Article 101 is to identify forms of collusion
among competitors and collusion is present when there is coordination and
471
cooperation among competitors occurs instead of risk-oriented competition.
Article 101, the ECJ declared, prohibits agreements maintaining an anti472
competitive object as well as agreements realizing anti-competitive effects.
Once the anti-competitive objective is identified, Article 101 is breached and there
is no need to explore whether anti-competitive effects have been felt by the market
473
place.
The ECJ also commented on the exchange of information among the
competing parties that would constitute an Article 101 violation. The ECJ stated
that no business information, either directly or indirectly, should be relayed
between and among competitors that would influence the activity of actual or
potential competitors, nor should any information be disclosed about the nature of
474
products or services offered by the competitors.
Moreover, if the exchange of
information between and among competitors removes uncertainty in market
475
operations, Article 101 has been breached.
The ECJ held that national courts must apply a presumption that Article 101
has been infringed, thus shifting the burden of proof to the alleged infringers, when
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competitors willingly meet and exchange vital business information and remain
476
active in the market place.
2.

Analysis

The sharing of business information may be the next significant challenge
for member states, consumers, and victimized competitors. Firms holding trade
secrets can work together to insulate themselves from the forces of competition
and injure consumers and other competitors that are not privy to the same
information. Such information can be shared quickly, privately, and easily. The
reader of this work would notice that Article 81 does not arise as often as its sister
Articles including 34, 36, and 102. However, member state governments, as well
as the EU government, will have to become more vigilant against such abuse in the
form of private agreements among competing firms.
The most challenging part of this enforcement is likely to be the
determination of whether the sharing of information has led to an agreement, and
then whether the agreement among the competitors has created anti-competitive
effects. The ECJ’s ruling in T-Mobile does state that the sharing of such
information, directly or indirectly, gives rise to an Article 101 violation. Policing
this matter will be made easier due to the ECJ’s holder that there exists a
presumption that Article 101 has been violated upon proof of shared information.
V.

ANALYSIS OF FREE MOVEMENT, COMPETITION, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS

An analysis of the jurisprudence of the ECJ on the balance between the
protection of intellectual property law on one hand and the free movement of
goods and undistorted competition on the other hand seems to favor the free
movement of goods and undistorted competition. The ECJ in the above cases
seems to err on the side of preventing intellectual property right holders, whether
the right is vested in a patent, trademark, or copyright, from asserting their rights
under national law to prevent the possibility of trade restraint.
This is not to say that nationally-granted intellectual property rights are
worthless. Indeed, the ECJ has stated that the national intellectual property right is
unyielding, but only if the right holder manufactures and markets the product
within the member state granting the right. However, once the right holder’s
product leaves the territory, the doctrine of Community-wide exhaustion of rights
(i.e., regional exhaustion) prevails in most cases. The ECJ will not uphold a
national law inhibiting the free movement of goods once the right holder has
acquiesced, whether explicitly or implicitly and however mildly, such as is the case
of parallel imports, to the sale of the protected product in another market.
This reality poses a challenging dilemma for firms with substantial
intellectual property rights. The European Commission’s decisions and the
opinions from the ECJ show that firms must think very carefully about placing
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their protected products in other member states, as the threat of parallel import is
significant. The Advocate General Reischl’s comment in the Merck v. Stephar
decision—that there is very little relationship between patentability and price—is
477
clearly unfounded as many cases show the real value in parallel importing.
The
reader of these cases can only imagine the financial resources that an intellectual
property right holder will spend in litigation trying to protect these rights against a
tide that is clearly against them. Such litigation costs, both within the EU and
internationally, help reveal the true value of such rights as assets to be protected.
In other words, right holders would not spend these resources if the stakes were
low.
Making this dilemma even more challenging is the possibility that
international exhaustion becomes the norm. The jurisprudence of the ECJ makes it
clear that regional exhaustion is the norm, but the ECJ has not stated that regional
exhaustion of rights within the EU is the limit. The EFTA Court has been more
direct and, after examining the same ECJ jurisprudence in Mag Instrument, held
478
member states are free to adopt international exhaustion rights if they so desire.
Firms that are heavily dependent upon their intellectual property rights should
begin to plan for the possibility of international exhaustion as the EU becomes
more comfortable with regional exhaustion and the member state governments also
press for such limitations. However, if international exhaustion were to become
the standard in regard to the balance between intellectual property rights and trade
restraint, the ECJ and the EFTA Court would have to better coordinate their
precedents. Otherwise, this would be a threat to harmonization in the EU and
EEA. Given the Swiss Federal Court’s decision in Kodak, there may be a battle
between strict national exhaustion and international exhaustion on the European
479
continent.
If Switzerland is able to improve its level of foreign direct
investment through its intellectual property laws, other member states may
abandon the current trajectory and retreat to national exhaustion, which would
certainly be more popular with firms possessing intellectual property rights.
There are exceptions that the ECJ has carved out of the TFEU—such as
allowing a right holder to assert rights having the effect of trade restraint—aside
from the traditional exhaustion doctrine. The ECJ will allow the assertion of
intellectual property rights to block the movement of goods if consumer health is
jeopardized (i.e., if repackaging could contaminate the product), or if the products
might lead to consumer confusion (i.e., two related products with similar names),
or if there will be serious damage to the reputation of the right owner. If, however,
a trademark right holder suspects serious interference with its rights in these
circumstances, the right holder is wise to exercise its right to demand a sample of
the packaging and challenge the method of the parallel import.
The ECJ has stated that royalty payments are due right holders and parties
who are tied to such agreements making them responsible for the payment of
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royalties are not able to invoke Articles 101 or 102 as a barrier to payment.
Additionally, when agreements between a right owner-licensor and licensee
specify the geographic range of broadcast rights for the licensee, the licensee
cannot hide behind any of the Articles and refuse to adhere to those limits.
However, these exception cases are rare and those seeking to protect their products
and market them in another member state will not often be able to rely on the
intellectual property rights. Indeed, in the case where two product names are
similar, if the marketer of one of the products is willing to change the name of the
product, the opposing right holder may do little to prevent the product’s
importation into the member state that has granted the rights.
Despite these bright-line rules, the ECJ has still left a void in the area of
trademark law and to a lesser degree patent law and copyright law. In the
circumstance where two competing firms, each with intellectual property rights
from two different member states (e.g., Country A and Country B), and they
attempt to enter a third member state (e.g., Country C) with identical trademarks,
there is no solution in EU law as to which firm has prevailing rights in the third
country (Country C). Instead, if any solution exists, it must be found in the
domestic law of that third member state. This is a void that can only be addressed
by way of legislation from the European Commission or European Council.
Additionally, a right holder will not be allowed to dominate information and
the ECJ will allow for the free flow of information when one or a few parties are
able to abuse a dominant position in regard to television media.
VI. CONCLUSION
The EU, and its law, has come a long way in sixty years and a legally united
480
Europe may not be far away.
The momentum toward unification and integration
481
seems to be linear.
Without question, this body of law will continue to evolve.
But the law seems to be evolving consistent with the international trend whereby
intellectual property rights are weakened to accommodate the interests of the
world’s consumers and the ever-increasing number of free trade agreements. The
decisions by the ECJ and its sister court, the EFTA Court, could prove to become
the playbook by which other judicial organs follow as they are created to deal with
conflicts arising from future trade agreements. Given the experiences of the ECJ
and EFTA Court, the world’s countries should have less fear as to how any trade
court would handle disputes and the associated leaders should have greater faith in
these tribunals.
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